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THE FORMER-TESTIMONY EXCEPTION IN THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Michael M. Martin*
According to one member of the Advisory Committee which drafted
them, the proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates' were promulgated -to "improve the truth-finding capacity
of the courts," as well as to provide the benefits of simplification and
uniformity.2 In much the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have led to modernization of procedural rules in many
states,3 the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence may be the vehicle by
which improvements unsuccessfully codified in the Model Code of
Evidence 4 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence5 can finally be achieved
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law; BA.. 1964, J.D.
1966, University of Iowa; B.Litt. 1968, Oxford University.ICox=m m ON RULEs OF PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRoPosED RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR =E UNITED STATES CoURTS AND
MAGISTRATES (Rev. Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as Fm. R. Evn.], also in 51
F.R.D. 315 (1971).
The Revised Draft was returned by the Supreme Court to the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
in March 1971. See FED. R. Evm. at 2. The Committee asked that comments on
rzevisions be submitted by August 1, 1971, in order to resubmit the Rules during
the October 1971 Term of the Court. There has been no published indication
of when final promulgation might be expected.2 Weinstein, Introduction, A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 48 F.R.D. 39, 41 (1969).
sSee 1 W. BARR N & A. HOLTzOFr, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PRocEDuRE §§ 9-10
(1960, Supp. 1971).4 MODEr. CODE OF EVIDEN E (1942). The Model Code apparently has not been
enacted in any jurisdiction. See 7 CAL. L. REVISION CoaN'Rx, REPORTS, RECOMS.E-
DATIONS, AND STUDIES, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENcE CODE 29, 32 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CAL. L. REVISION Cozuv'N].5 NATIONAL CoNr. OF Coneu'as ON Unir=O STATE LAWS, UNIFom RuLEs OF
EvImcE (1953) [hereinafter cited as UNIFosr R. EvID.]. The Uniform Rules have
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across the United States. Thus, the goal which for a generation has
eluded American reformers of evidence law-removal of some of the
common-law impediments to the judicial search for truth-may finally
be within reach.
In view of this potential effect of the proposed Federal Rules, both
the changes which they propose and those not made should be
subjected to close scrutiny. The purpose of this article is to examine
one small part of the codification effort, the provisions regarding the
admissibility of former testimony taken by deposition or at a prior
hearing. In undertaking this examination, particular attention will be
focused upon the following three aspects of former testimony: (1) The
"motive and interest" standard for ensuring trustworthiness of former
testimony, and the manner in which its acceptance as a "reform" posi-
tion has been adopted by the drafters without providing to the bench
and bar sufficient guidance regarding its operation in practice; (2) the
provisions of the proposed Federal Rules which would permit admis-
sion of prior testimony against its former proponent, another liberaliza-
tion of current rules of evidence which has not heretofore been given
close analysis; and (3) the retention by the Advisory Committee of the
unavailability requirement, a situation in which modernization was
explicitly rejected. Analysis will indicate that such rejection was
perhaps the result of constitutional concerns, and the validity of these
concerns will be reviewed. Constitutional aspects of related former-
testimony situations also will be examined.
I. Fomvmu TEs~mwoy
Testimony given by a person on one occasion may be offered into
evidence for a variety of purposes at a subsequent hearing. Former
testimony may be offered, for example, to impeach a witness or to
refresh his recollection. 7 In both of these situations, the truthfulness
of the content of the former testimony is disregarded. In some situa-
tions, the former testimony itself may be the fact in issue, as would
be the case where such testimony serves as the basis of a perjury
been adopted, with some modifications, in Kansas, New Jersey, and the Virgin
Islands. See KAw. STAT. AxNN. ch. 60, art. 4 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A
(Supp. 1971); V.I. CODE Aiqw. tit. 5, ch. 67 (1967). The California Law Revision
Commission, after studying the Uniform Rules, see 6 CAL. L. REVISio CosfxN
(1964), concluded that the t"horough revision of evidence law necessary could not
be accomplished by their adoption. See 7 id. at 33-34; Graham, California's "Re-
statement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codification
Fiasco, 4 LOYOLA U. (L.A.) L. REV. 279 (1971).
0 See People v. Downs, 114 Cal. App. 2d 758, 762-63, 251 P.2d 369, 371-72 (1952).
7See C. McCoturcK, LAW OF EvImmc § 230, at 481 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRsncx].
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prosecution8 or perhaps of an action for defamation or malicious pros-
ecution 9 This article, however, deals with none of the above situa-
tions, but instead pertains only to former testimony offered substan-
tively to prove the facts asserted in the testimony. As such, former
testimony must be recognized as an exception to the general bar to
hearsay testimony. The scope of this analysis is further limited by
excluding from discussion former testimony admissible under other
hearsay exceptions such as admissions and declarations against
interest.0
A. Former Testimony as Hearsay
The general inadmissibility into evidence of former testimony has
been variously explained. Some courts have used the relevancy max-
im, res inter alios acta, as a basis of exclusion' That doctrine does
not justify exclusion, however, since such testimony does not neces-
sarily pertain to a transaction between strangers, nor does it thereby
lack probative value on material issues. It may, in fact, be highly
probative if its credibility can be established. The probative value of
former testimony is suggested by a second explanation sometimes
given for its exclusion, namely that "the best evidence the case will
admit of must always be pioduced" and former testimony is not the
best evidence of that to which a witness could testify viva voce.12 This
latter explanation for the general inadmissibility of former testimony
is also out of favor, however, now that the "best evidence" rule is
deemed to be concerned only with those situations where the terms
of the original document are themselves material.1 3 In the case of
former testimony, the material fact is what the witness has said on the
earlier occasion.
The principal reason for excluding former testimony from evidence
is that it contravenes the rule which bars admission of hearsay. That
rule, as commonly stated, excludes statements made at a time or place
other than at the hearing in which they are offered into evidence to
8 See State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 173, 177 P.2d 689, 705 (1947).
9 See 5 J. WiGom, Evmnsm § 1387, at 94, § 1416, at 197-98 (3d ed. 1940) [here-
inafter cited as WxGmORE:].
10 For a brief discussion of admissions and declarations against interest, see
5 WiGaoRE § 1416.
"'Fresh v. Gilson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 327, 331-32 (1842); see S. PHipsoN, Evx-
DEacCE 1 1423 (10th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Pmwsox].
12 See, e.g., Fresh v. Gilson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 327, 332 (1842); accord, Fuentes
v. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85, 98 (1873), rev'd on other grounds, 92 U.S. 10, 16 (1876);
ParsoN 1424.
13 See McCoimncK §§ 195-96. But see Turner v. Southwest Mo. R.R., 138 Mo.
App. 143, 149, 120 S.W. 128, 129 (1909). See generally Annot., 11 AJ. R.2d 30,
47-53, 117-21 (1950).
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prove the truth of the facts asserted.14 Hearsay statements are usually
excluded from evidence on the ground that they have not been sub-
jected to the following three ideal conditions or tests usually assumed
to be necessary in order to assure the reliability of a witness' percep-
tion, memory, sincerity, and narration: 1 (1) The oath, which is the
formal statement calculated to impress upon the witness his duty to
tell the truth;16 (2) co:afrontation, or the giving of evidence in open
court in the personal presence of the trier of fact and the adversary; 7
and (3) cross-examination, which permits the adversary by his ques-
tioning of the witness to expose deficiencies in perception, memory,
sincerity, and narration.18 Since hearsay statements are not accom-
panied by these assurances, they are generally inadmissible unless the
particular evidence is necessary-in the sense that a failure of justice
may result from loss of the testimony--or unless the evidence has
other assurances of trustworthiness, or both.' 9 The proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence conthiue the tradition of excluding hearsay evidence
unless it comes within one of the stated exceptions for classes of
evidence which are deemed to be of special necessity or reliability.20
Because former testimony is given under conditions which theoreti-
cally assure trustworthiness, such testimony is generally classified as
an exception to the hearsay rule.' If the former-testimony exception
is measured against other hearsay exceptions by application of the
three ideal assurances of reliability noted above, it becomes apparent
that this particular type of hearsay evidence is especially trustworthy. 22
Since prior testimony has been given under oath and subject to cross-
examination, the only safeguard lost in admission of such testimony
24 See, eg., FED. R. Evm. 801 (c); McComncK § 225; Cross, The Scope of the Rule
Against Hearsay, 72 L.Q. Rix. 91, 100 (1956).
15 See Fm. It Evm., Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem 94-95; Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the A'pplication of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177,
185-88 (1948).
10 See FE. R. Evm. 603; 5 WiGuoRE § 1362.
17 See 5 WIrmom § 1395(2); cf. FED. R. Ci'. P. 43(a); FED. R. Cam. P. 26.
18 See 5 W xoRE §§ 1367.-68; Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODs OF EVIDENCE
36-50 (1942).
V0 See 5 WiioiRE §§ 1362, 1420-23.
2 0 See FED. B. Evm., Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem 802; FED. B. Evm.,
Advisory Committee's Note, at 94-97. Compare FED. R. Evm. 803, 804 with Fm. B.
Evm. 8-03, 8-04 (Prelim. Draft 1969).21 McCo UCK § 230.2 2 See Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAtv. L. Rsv. 481, 552 (1946);
When the trustworthiness of testimony given in open court, under oathand subject to cross-examination, is compared with that of numerous
utterances receivable a; exceptions to the hearsay rule, the restrictionsenforced as to its admissibility seem little short of ridiculous. Were the
same strictness applied to all hearsay, evidence of reported testimony
would constitute the only exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
[Vol 57
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is the demeanor evidence normally gained from the confrontation be-
fore the trier of fact.
B. The Former-Testimony Exception in the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Some Fundamentals
The former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule has been in-
corporated into the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, and is em-
bodied in Rule 804. The Revised Draft of that Rule states in perti-
nent part:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hear-
ing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with law in the course of another proceeding, at the instance
of or against a party with an opportunity to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest similar
to those of the party against whom now offered 3The remainder of this article will analyze the various elements of this
formulation, beginning with the fundamental requirement that the
former testimony be given by a witness at another hearing or in a
deposition.
1. "Given as a Witness"
In order to qualify for admission into evidence under Rule 804 (b)
(1) of the proposed Federal Rules, the out-of-court statement must
have been testimony "given as a witness." The fact that the prior
testimony has been given by a person acting as a witness implies that
the testimony has been given under oath, since an oath or affirmation
is required of every witness 4 or deponent.2 This implicit require-
ment of an oath functions as one of the major indicia of the reliability
of former testimony.26 As indicated above, hearsay is generally ob-
23Fm. R. Evm, 804(6) (1).
24 F . R. Evm. 603.
25 FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(c).
26 An oath will not, of course, obviate the hearsay dangers to the extent of mak-
ing evidence given under oath admissible without any other guarantee of re-
liability. See 5 Wicwo § 1362, at 7. Unlike depositions, therefore, affidavits
are inadmissible under the former testimony exception. See id. § 1384. It might
be argued that an affidavit is admissible under FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1) against its
procurer because he has the opportunity to develop the evidence by direct ex-
amination. However, an affidavit is not a deposition or "testimony given as a
witness at [a] hearing," as required by that Rule, and should be admissible, if at
all, only as an adoptive admission under Rule 801(d) (2) (ii). This difference in
the means for admission is critical in the situation where an affidavit has not been
offered into evidence. A deposition is admissible under the former testimony
rules regardless of whether it has been previously offered into evidence because
its reliability has been assured by the opportunity for cross-examination. An
affidavit, on the other hand, has no such assurance (apart from the oath), unless
the party attests to its reliability by offering it into evidence. See generally 6
CAL. L. RsvisIox Coam', Appendix 440 (1964).
1972]
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jectionable, at least in part, because its reliability is unestablished.
Through the process of subjecting the witness to an oath requirement,
ormner testimony is generally thought to gain reliability, and is thus
acceptable as an exception to the general rule barring hearsay testi-
mony. Although there is a tendency to discount the importance of an
oath in the present religious climate of this country, there is some
experimental evidence indicating that witnesses tend to be more
circumspect in their testimony if the importance of testifying truthfully
is impressed upon them through the requirement of an oath. 27
2. "At Another Hearing"
Former testimony is admissible under Rule 804 (b) (1) if given at"another hearing of the same or a different proceeding.12 8  This
formulation indicates a substantial departure from purely formal com-
mon-law requirements which would admit testimony only if it were
taken at a prior hearing of the same action.29 The proposed Federal
Rule places emphasis on the testimony itself, with the nature of the
prior hearing being unimportant except to the extent that any such
prior hearing did not present an opportunity for cross-examination
equivalent to cross-examination in the present proceeding.30 The pro-
posed Rules have in effect retained the common-law minimum require-
ment that the former testimony be given at a prior hearing in which
cross-examination could have been compelled or was in fact effected.3 3
There is not, however, any requirement in the proposed Rules that the
prior hearing be of the same type, civil or criminal, for example, as
the present one.32
The proposed Rule alo allows admission of testimony contained in
a "deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of another
proceeding." Depositions taken in connection with the present
2 7 See H. BURTT, LEGAL PskCaorLoGY 153-54 (1931); Gardner, The Preception and
Memory of Witnesses, 18 ComvRL L.Q. 391, 408 (1932); Stewart Perception,
Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism, of Present Law and the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAE: L. REv. 1, 22-23.2 8FE. R. Evm. 804(6) (1).
2 9 See generally AR=. R. Crv. P. 43(e); CoNN. GEm. STAT. Aiur. § 52-160 (1960);
IOWA CODE § 622.97 (1971).30 See text accompanying ELotes 64-82 infra.
31 See generally 5 WxinzonE §§ 1373-75. See also Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm.,
223 Ark. 465, 467, 266 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1954); In re Gorsuch, 147 Kan. 459, 460, 78
P.2d 12, 13 (1938) (regarding effect of procedures at bar disciplinary jproceedings
on admissibility at trial of former testimony).
3 2 FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1). Compare McInturff v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
248 IMi. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910). Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128 (1862), and M. Werk
Co. v. Martin, 18 Ohio L. Ab 5. 81 (Ct. App. 1934) with Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 322 P.2d 417, 421 (Okla. 1958). See also Arnot., 46 A.L.R. 463 (1927).
[Vol. 57
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proceeding, however, are governed by Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. That rule becomes entwined with the rules of
evidence because it makes a deposition admissible, in certain defined
circumstances, against any party with reasonable notice of its taking
"so far as [such deposition is] admissible under the rules of evidence
applied as though the witness were then present and testifying."33
Rule 32(a) thus creates a special hearsay exception for depositions
taken in a current proceeding for which there need be no provision
in the rules of evidence.34 A situation which is apparently not cov-
ered by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, can arise when a deposition is offered
against a party who was joined after the taking of the deposition.
Since such a party would not have received notice of the examination,
the deposition would not be admissible under Rule 32 (a). And because
there was no "other proceeding," the literal language of Rule 804 (b)
(1) would also seem to bar admission of the deposition testimony,
even though the examination may have conformed to the other
requirements of that Rule. It seems probable, however, that the dep-
osition would be deemed to have been taken in "another proceeding,"
since the deponent was not a party to the current proceeding at the
time of the examination.35 Under this construction, Rule 804 (b) (1)
would allow admission of the deposition, and the dilemma would thus
be avoided.
II. RELTABILITY oF Fovnm TEsTImoNY:
MOTIVE AN INTEREST AS A STANDARD
A. Opportunity to Cross-Examine
Given the faith which the Anglo-American adversary system places
in the efficacy of cross-examination, it is not surprising that the most
important feature of the former-testimony exception is that which
33 FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a) (emphasis added). The italicized phrase was added in
1970. See 4A J. Mooim, FEDERAL PRACTICE 32.01 (2d ed. 1971). Under FED. R
Civ. P. 32(a) depositions are admissible (1) to impeach the testimony of the de-
ponent as a witness; (2) for any purpose, against the deponent who is an adverse
party or speaking agent therefor; and (3) for any purpose, when the deponent
(a) is dead, (b) is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or outside
the United States, unless his absence was procured by the offering party, (c) is
unable to testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment, or (d) can-
not be procured by subpoena from offering party, or (e) when "such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
open court to allow the deposition to be used." Id.34 See FED. M. Evm. 802; 4A J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE % 32.01[4] (2d. ed. 1971).35 See 4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE g 32.02 & n.3 (2d. ed. 1971).
19721
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requires such testimony to have been given in a situation where an
opportunity existed to utilize that truth-testing device. The former-
testimony exception to the hearsay rule is unique in this respect, as
no other exception makes cross-examination a requirement for ad-
missibility, and it is not usually discussed in connection with evidence
admitted under other exceptions.31 It was this opportunity to cross-
examine which led Wigmore to characterize former testimony as un-
objectionable under the hearsay rule, rather than as admissible as one
of its exceptions.37  In. order to ensure the reliability of former
testimony, the proposed Federal Rules retain 'the requirement that the
opponent be given the opportunity to develop the testimony by cross-
examination.
While the former-testimony exception has always required an op-
portunity for cross-examination by the opponent, the fact that some
cross-examination could have occurred has never in itself satisfied that
requirement.38 Additional safeguards have been required to ensure
that hearsay evidence would not be admitted unless the testimony was
given under such circumstances that it was equivalent in reliability to
testimony given viva voce.39 One such safeguard which has common-
30 Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (prior inconsistent statements).
37 Wigmore defined the hearsay rule as "rejecting assertions, offered testi-
monially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of Cross-
examination." 5 WMuOE § 1362, at 3. This definition has given rise to some
expressions that former testimony is admissible (at least, when the prior opponent
had a motive and interest in cross-examining similar to that of the present op-
ponent) because it does not violate the hearsay rule, rather than because it
satisfies an exception to that; rule. See Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 868, 158
So. 508, 510 (1935); Minneapolis ill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 51 Minn. 304,
315, 53 N.W. 639, 642 (1892); 5 WGaoa § 1370. The different formulations of the
hearsay rule, see note 14 Tupra and accompanying text, make little practical
difference in the present context, since most views of the former testimony ex-
ception incorporate requiremimts implementing the interests in cross-examination
which Wigmore deemed essential. However, if the Model Code formulation,
which admits hearsay whenever the declarant is unavailable, MODEr- CODE OP
EvIDEIcE rule 503(a) (1942), is used, former testimony may be admitted even
when there has not been the equivalent of present opportunity to cross-examine
which Wigmore requires. See McConaanC §§ 230, 238; Glicksberg, Former Testi-
mony Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence and in Florida, 10 U. FLa. L. REV.
269, 273-74 (1957); Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 34 N.C.L. J.l-v. 294, 301-02 (1956).
iBSee, e.g., CAL. Evm. COD. §§ 120-92 (West 1966); N.J.R. Evm. 63(3); 5
WiGanOri § 1386. The Model Code probably goes furthest toward relying on
cross-examination alone. Former testimony would be admissible in any action
for any purpose for which it was admissible in the action in which it was taken.
The only restriction imposed is that the judge has discretion to reject the evidence
if the declarant is available. MODEL CODE oF Evmsxc Rule 511 (1942).
30 See 5 WrGuora § 1386.
[Voel 57
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ly been required in order to ensure reliability is that there be identity
of issues and parties in the prior and present proceedings. The pro-
posed Rules adopt a more liberal approach by focusing upon the
question of whether the parties in -the two proceedings possess similar
motives and interests.
B. "Identity of Parties and Issues"
In addition to cross-examination, the traditional formulations of the
former-testimony exception, sometimes adopted in statutes, require
"identity of parties and issues"40 or that present and former hearings
be "between the same parties, relating to the same matter,"4 before
such testimony may be held admissible. Literal compliance with these
shorthand phrases was often found to be highly restrictive in view of
the frequent need for the former testimony and as a result, qualifica-
tions were engrafted onto the traditional requirements. However, such
qualifications frequently led to errors of their own. For example, when
testimony was admitted against a successor in interest, some courts
noted the privity relationship and made the property-law concept of
privity in blood, law, or estate the only permissible deviation from the
"identity of parties" requirement.42 This primrose path was extended
when a "mutuality" requirement was borrowed from the procedural
preclusion area and incorporated into the former-testimony excep-
tion.43 By using formalisms to thus limit the former-testimony excep-
40 See MCCoRMCK §§ 232, 233; Psn'soN 1423; Annot., 70 AL.R.2d 494 (1960).
4 1 See CAL. CoDE CIv. P. § 1870(8) (1872); 5 WIGMORE §§ 1386-88. Statutes au-
thorizing admission of former testimony are generally construed as only declara-
tive of the common law, and not as imposing limitations upon it. See McCoR McK
§ 230; 5 WimoRE § 1387.4 2 See, e.g., McComncs § 232; 5 WInoRE § 1388; Annot, 142 A.L.1. 673 (1943).
Strictly applied, this restriction can work to admit testimony from the decedents
personal injury action in a subsequent survival action but not in a wrongful death
action. See Axsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 139-45, 292 P. 436, 437-38
(1930). See generalliy Morgan, supra note 22, at 550. The English courts have
apparently retained the property-law concepts in this area. See PmIsox f 1427.
Professor Vestal makes a point too frequently neglected by courts applying a
privity restriction on former testimony when he says, in another context: "Pri-
vity is a term obviously of indefinite meaning and is given content only through
judicial construction. When a relationship is labeled as one involving 'privity'
the court is saying that certain legal results follow." Vestal, Preclusion/Res
Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27, 60 (1964). For a further discussion
of this topic, see id. at 44-45.
43 See eropolitan St. Ry. v. Gumby, 99 F. 192, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1900). The
defect in former testimony rules based on the preclusion analogy is that pre-
clusion deprives the litigant of his day in court if it is applied to prohibit litiga-
tion of an issue (unless the issue has already been decided), while the admission
of former testimony cannot deprive a litigant of his day in court. The opponent
can always rebut or impeach the former testimony admitted. See Copeland v.
19721
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tion to cases where the issues and parties or their privies were identi-
cal and the testimony would have been admissible if offered against its
present proponent, the courts lost sight of the essential question
regarding admissibility.44 That crucial question is whether, given that
the opponent can not now cross-examine the witness, the examination
on the prior occasion wvas fairly equivalent to cross-examination in the
present situation.45 A few courts recognized the soundess of this more
general inquiry quite early, and Wigmore preached this gospel at least
from the time he edited the sixteenth edition of Greenleaf's Evidence
in 1899.' 6 While old ways died hard,4 7 the courts gradually progressed
away from the requirement of literal identity of parties and issues
toward a consideration of the reliability of the testimony in light of the
circumstances. Accordingly, increasing attention was given to two
related issues: (1) Whether the opponent's interest was represented in
the first hearing, rather than whether there was identity of parties or
privies on both sides, 48 and (2) whether the issues in the two hearings
were similar to the extent that the opponent in the first examination
had a motive and interest to develop the testimony similar to those
which the present opponent would have if he were cross-examining. 49
Despite adoption by courts of this more flexible approach, there were
still many references to "privity," "representation," and "derivative
Petroleum Transit Co., 32 F.R.D. 445, 447-48 (E.D.S.C. 1963); Hertz v. Graham,
23 F.R.D. 17, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and Illinois Evidence Law, 49 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 481, 492-93 (1954). The
"mutuality" rule is still applied in England. See PHIESON 1425.44 See McCoraacK §§ 232-33.
45 See generally FzD. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Comnittee's Note at 127; 5
WirnoE § 1386.
46 1 S. GREN LEA, EVmENCE 278-79 (16th ed., J. Wigmore ed. 1899).4 7 It is interesting that the argument persuasive to the court in a leading case
applying the strict requirements was that Wigmore's position would permit the
admission of testimony by a witness to a common-carrier accident in successive
actions against the carrier. Mclnturff v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 248 ll.
92, 98, 93 N.E. 369, 371 (1910). That is the very situation in which modern
formulations are deemed to be desirable. See 6 CAL. L. REv. CoLi'=N, Appendix
448; McCoRMIcK § 232 & rA.9. The leading, and perhaps only, case carrying the
Wigmore view to its full extdent involved such a common-carrier action. Bartlett
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv, Co., $49 Mo. 13, 21, 160 S.W.2d 740, 745 (1942); see
Morgan, supra note 22, at 551-52.
4 See, e.g., Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13 F.R.D. 27, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); O'Meara v. McDermott, 40 Mont. 38, 57-58, 104 P. 1049, 1055 (1909); Welch
v. Essex County, 6 N.J. Super. 422, 428-29, 68 A.2d 787, 791 (Essex County Ct.
1949), aff'd, 6 N.J. Super. 184, 70 A.2d 779 (App. Div. 1950); McComncK § 232.
49 See, e.g., Gibson v Gagnon, 82 Colo. 108, 113-14, 257 P. 348, 350 (1927); Welch
v. Essex County, 6 N.J. Suoper. 422, 431, 68 A.2d 787, 792 (Essex County Ct. 1949),
af'd, 6 N.J. Super. 184, 70 A.2d 779 (App. Div. 1950); Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal.
2d 611, 616, 150 P.2d 892, 894 (1944) (dictum); McCoRMcK § 233.
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causes of action" on the one hand, and "similar issues," rather than
"motive and interest" on the other.50
C. "Motive and Interest" in the Federal Rules
1. Basic Concepts
The formulation of the former-testimony exception in the proposed
Federal Rules eliminates all the easy shorthand rules and forces con-
sideration of the essential question of the propriety of admitting the
offered former testimony rather than requiring viva voce testimony.
In determining whether the prior examination was adequate to pro-
tect the interest of the opponent in the present case, the only question
under the proposed Rules is whether the examiner had "motive and
interest [for developing the testimony] similar to those of the party
against whom now offered."51
Although the "motive and interest" concept focuses more closely on
the true objective of the "identity of parties and issues" requirement-
ensuring basic fairness to the opponent in admitting previously given
testimony-the modern test is more difficult to apply. The difficulty
arises because the terms "similar motive and interest" have here-
tofore acquired no significant content and, moreover, because the
drafters of the Federal Rules have suggested no useful criteria in
adopting the standard5 2 Undoubtedly, the Advisory Committee was
concerned that it should not bind trial court discretion by inelastic
standards.53 Nevertheless, the Committee's failure to suggest criteria
to facilitate exercise of that discretion may prompt some courts to
follow the standards developed under the "identity of parties and
issues" concept until they are overruled. Even for the more venture-
some trial judges, a search beyond the drafters' comments is unlikely
to prove very fruitful. While several authorities have dealt briefly
50 See, e.g., Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 1, 33, 198
A.2d 791, 808 (App. Div. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609
(1965); Duffy v. Blake, 91 Wash. 140, 143, 157 P. 480, 482 (1916), modified on
other grounds, 94 Wash. 319, 162 P. 521 (1917).
5.FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1). That Rule requires that the "party" in the prior
proceeding be the one with similar motive and interest to develop the testimony.
Id. Therefore, participation in the former action as an attorney, for example, see
United States v. Silliman, 6 F.R.D. 262, 264 (D.N.J. 1946), or a non-party such
as an insurer in a suit by or against the insured, cf. A. VESTAL, RES JuDIcATA/
PREcLUsioN 291-300 (1969), would appear not to be suffficient for admissibility
if none of the parties had the requisite motive and interest in his own right.
But cf. Glicksberg, supra note 37, at 278-79.
52See Fm. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126-28; Symposium
on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal
Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1076, 1205 (1969).
53See Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 52,
at 1205.
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with the requirements of the proposed doctrine, no significant stand-
ards have yet been devised. For example, although Wigmore farst
spoke in terms of interest and motive over 70 years ago, even the
latest edition of his treatise does no more than indicate that in
considering the admissibility of former testimony the issues must be"substantially the same," and that property law should be a reference,
though not controlling, in determining whether the interests of the
respective parties are sufficiently the same.54  Similarly, McCormick's
only contribution is that "identity of interest, in the sense of motive,
rather than technical identity of cause of action or title, is the test."55
The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence introduced
the idea that the prior examination can be assumed adequate "if the
same stakes are involved."5 6 This idea of "stakes" is adopted and
elaborated upon in the Reports of the California Law Revision Com-
mission relating to adoption of the California Evidence Code 7 The
illustration given of a situation in which the motive and interest of
prior and present parties are deemed to be the same is where testimony
given in one negligence action on behalf of a passenger injured in a
common-carrier crash is offered against that carrier in an action by
another passenger injured in the same crash.5" On the other hand, the
stakes are deemed not. to be the same when testimony taken in a
discovery deposition is offered at a trial.5 9 There is, however, no
explanation of the factors which were important in making the
distinction between the situations.
Because of this lack of guiding criteria, a major purpose of this anal-
ysis will be to provide some content for the "motive and interest" test
by suggesting some significant factors which should be considered in
approaching this aspect of the former-testimony issue. As the Ad-
visory Committee notes, the basic inquiry regarding the admissibility
of former testimony is "whether fairness allows imposing, upon the
party against whom now offered, the handling of the witness on the
earlier occasion." 60 Since the opponent's argument against admission
of former testimony is that he is deprived of the opportunity to bring
54 Compare 5 Wicmos § 1387, at 83, and id. § 1388, at 101-02, with 1 S. GREEn-
LEAP, EVIDEN E 278-79 (16th ed., J. Wigmore ed. 1899). See also Morgan, supra
note 22, at 55L
G McCoRirxc § 232, at 489.
GG Nsv JERSEY SUPREME COURT CoMTn. ON EVIDENCE, REPoRT 141-42 (1963).
5 7 See CAL. L. REVISION Comex, Hearsay Evidence 1250.
r5sSee 6 CAL. L. REvisrio Comx', Appendix 448; 7 CAL. L. REVmON Comxr,
Hearsay Evidence 1249.
5o5See 6 CAL. REvisION CoLnex, Appendix 316-17; 7 CAL. L. REI=ION CoLmex,
Hearsay Evidence 1249; text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
60 Mm. R. EvID. 804(b) (1), Advisory Comnittee's Note, at 127; see 5 WImoRE §
1386.
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out relevant facts, the objective of the motive and interest test is to
determine whether there is any significant reason why facts relevant
to the present inquiry, including those reflecting on the credibility of
the witness, would not have been elicited at the prior hearing. A"significant reason" for these purposes would be one which would
affect the conduct of the examination by a reasonable attorney in the
same circumstances. It is unfair to hold a party to the former
examination if no reasonable attorney would be expected to have
elicited the now-relevant facts; but if the circumstances were such that
those facts could have been brought out if they were available, the
present opponent can fairly be held. By focusing on this essentially
factual question, the court can avoid both the rigid formalism of the
"identity of parties and issues" concept and the subjective abstraction
of the doctrine of "motive and interest."
Phrasing the inquiry in terms of whether the evidence is reliable on
the present occasion because of the lack of any significant reason why
the record should not be substantially complete means, of course, that
any inquiry into the relationship between the parties-opponent is
superfluous. Thus, none of the modern codifications impose any sort of
requirement as to the parties involved in the prior and present pro-
ceeding, except that there must have been a party at the former hear-
ing who had no reason not to bring out the facts which, if available,
the present opponent would like to bring out now.6 1 Similarly pre-
cluded is any inquiry into matters of tactical choice or the examiner's
ability to prepare for thorough development of the testimony, such as,
for example, his access to investigative funds or the availability of
discovery procedures. While there is no question but that these factors
can mean relevant facts are sometimes not elicited, it is equally
indisputable that no authority considers them sufficient factors for
excluding former testimony; the question is always phrased in terms
of "opportunity" and "motive and interest," rather than "actual
examination" and "ability" to develop the testimony fully.6 2 The
reason for such a formulation is, of course, that in the choice between
holding the opponent to the prior examination and losing highly
reliable evidence, fairness requires only that the circumstances were
such that an attorney making every effort within reason to bring out
facts on behalf of his client might have developed the testimony fully.
To require that he actually have done so would threaten the process
6 1 See, e.g., FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1290-92 (West 1966);
N.J.R. Evm. 63(3); MODEL CODE OF EvmmqcE Rule 511 (1942); UzuFomR R. EviD.
63(3).
62 See 5 WIGmoRE § 1371. See generally A. MoRRuLL, TRrAL DIPLOmCY §§ 4.16-17,
at 58-59 (1971), on tactical considerations in cross-examination.
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of fair decision making by making reliable evidence inaccessible to
the trier of fact.63
2. Factors Affecting Motive and Interest:
Toward Criteria for Evaluating Admissibility
of Former Testimony
As indicated above, an objective of this analysis is the formulation
of criteria for applying the test of similar motive and interest. It must
be noted that the following catalogue of reasons why relevant facts
might not have been elicited at a prior examination is not and could
not be complete. It may, however, provide some assistance in analyz-
ing the proper exercise of discretion vested in the courts by the Fed-
eral Rules provisions regarding admission of former testimony.
a. Facts Not Relevant in Prior Hearing,
The first, and probably most obvious, case in which it may be said
there was no similar motive and interest to develop the previously
given testimony is the situation where facts which are relevant in the
present hearing were possessed by the declarant in the previous pro-
ceeding, but were not relevant to any issue in that prior hearing."4
For example, W may testify for the state when D is charged with a
negligent driving offense. Such testimony as to the manner of D's
driving should be inadmissible, however, in P's action against D for
injuries incurred when D's negligently driven car collided with that
operated by P. This result is required because contributory negli-
gence was not an issue in the criminal action. Since P's conduct was
not relevant in the criminal proceeding, D had no reason or
opportunity-no motive or interest, in other words- to elicit whatever
knowledge W might have had about P's conduct.
The introduction of a new issue at the present hearing does not,
however, mean that the former testimony ought to be excluded auto-
matically. For example, a new issue of damages is introduced when
a wrongful death action succeeds an action for personal injuries, but
that fact alone provides no basis for excluding the former testimony of
a witness to the occurrence, since such a witness can presumably pro-
03 The effects of actual inequalities among counsel are presumed to be mini-
mlzed by ensuring the opportunity to develop the testimony through application of
the "motive and interest!' test. See generally Copeland v. Petroleum Transit Co.,
32 F.R.D. 445, 447-48 (E.D.S.C. 1963); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 23 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); 5 WIGLOR. § 1386. But cf. First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National Air-
lines, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 46, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).04 See, e.g., United States v. Bully, 282 F. Supp. 327, 332-33 (E.D. Va. 1968),
aff'd, 408 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1989); Parrish v. Bryant, 237 N.C. 256, 258, 74 S.E.2d
726, 727 (1953); Printing Telegraph & CMnstr. Co. of the Agence Havas, Ltd. v.
Drucker, [1894J 2 Q.B. 801, 802-03 (CA.).
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vide relevant evidence only on the issues common to both actions.65
In jurisdictions where "wide-open!' cross-examination is permissible,
an argument is occasionally made that former testimony is ipso facto
inadmissible if there is any new issue at the present hearing.68 The
better view would seem to require a showing that the witness could
have shed light on the new issue before accepting the opponent's argu-
ment that he was deprived of the opportunity to develop the witness'
testimony.
b. Facts Insignificant inz Prior Hearing
A second situation in which the opponent may argue an insufficient
opportunity to develop his case is where the now-relevant facts were
relevant only as to an insignificant issue in the prior proceeding. As
an illustration, in Wolf v. United Air Lines, Inc.67 the plaintiff brought
an action against the airline for the wrongful death of his decedent in
a plane crash allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. Plaintiff
moved to permit the use of depositions taken in other actions arising
out of the crash. The court denied the motion on the ground that
there had been cross-complaints by the airline against the co-defendant
airplane manufacturer in the prior actions. According to the Wolf
court, the issues between the defendants had been bitterly contested
and in some respects appeared to overshadow the primary issue of the
plaintiff's right to recover.8 8 Since the depositions were taken in that
atmosphere and many questions asked of the deponents were directed
toward the issues between the defendants, the court ruled that even
if the "identity of parties and issues" rule were not applied,69 the de-
positions would be inadmissible in the action against the airline alone.
The court reasoned that "under the prevailing circumstances the in-
terest and motive of [the airline] in its ... examination may very
well not have been the same at that time as it is now .... , 0 Although
65 See, e.g., Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13 F.RD. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
lid-City Bank & Trust Cb. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 323-24 (D.N.J. 1944);
Palon v. Great No. Ry., 135 Mnn. 154, 156-59, 160 N.W. 670, 671-72 (1961).
66 See, e.g., Glicksberg, supra note 37, at 280; Powers, supra note 37, at 303;
A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidence Law, 49
Nw. U.L. Rzv. 481, 493 (1954). Restrictions on the scope of cross-examination
have been removed in the Federal Rules. FED. R. Ev3. 611(b) & Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, at 82-83.
67 12 F.RD. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
68 d. at 3.
69 The applicable Pennsylvania rule permitted the admission of former testi-
mony only when "the parties and issues are the same . . . [and] the former
testimony was given under oath and was subject to right of cross-examination
by the adverse party." Id.
7O Id. at 4.
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many of the depositions contained facts relevant to the airline's liabil-
ity, the primary focus of the examinations was on issues between the
defendants for which those facts were not relevant, and the depositions
were therefore properly excluded."
c. Legal Issues Differ
Although the factual issues may be the same in the two hearings,
there may be occasions on which a difference in the legal issues
presented will provide the opponent with a reason for arguing that all
relevant facts might not have been successfully elicited. For example,
in cases involving a criminal charge, the same facts will be relevant at
the preliminary hearing as at the trial. Nevertheless, the fact that the
ultimate legal issue at the, preliminary hearing is probable cause rather
than guilt may lead the prosecution to examine its witnesses only to
the extent necessary to bring out facts sufficient to meet its burden on
that less-demanding issue. On the other side, the legal issue is such
that it takes rather full development of weaknesses in the prosecu-
tion's testimony in order for the defense to prevail at a preliminary
hearing.12 It might be argued that this factor provides an incentive
for the defense to develop testimony fully. However, when the diffi-
culties of conducting a thorough cross-examination at that stage 73 are
considered along with some of the other factors discussed below,74 it
is seen that the high burden placed on the defense may actually im-
pede rather than stimulate elicitation of all the relevant facts, since
it is less difficult and more effective to bring them out at another stage
of the proceedings.75
71 Id. But see 52 COLum L. REv. 666, 668 (1952). In Bauer v. Pullman Co., 15
Ohio App. 2d 69, 72-73, 239 X.2d 226, 229 (1968), the corporate defendant in a
personal injury action was held to its cross-examination of plaintiff's expert wit-
ness where certain injuries had been pleaded but no evidence on them was sub-
mitted until the retrial. See also State v. McManus, 129 Kam 376, 378, 282 P. 538,
589 (1929).72 See Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2_l 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1967).
73 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 195-200 (1970) (dissenting opinion);
Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Probleme, 30 LA. L.
REv. 651, 670 (1970).
7' See text accompanying notes 79-80 infra.
75 But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970), and Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965), which indicate that there is at least no confrontation
clause violation when testimoay given at a "full-fledged" preliminary hearing is
offered at trial. Such decisions may by themselves (provide a motive and interest
in full development of the testimony. See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1, 114 (1970); c. Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 493-
94, 233 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1968) (accused not cross-examining at preliminary hearing
for tactical reasons assumes risk of witness' later unavailability).
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d. Purpose of Examination Differs
A difference in the purposes of the examinations may also be a fac-
tor in determining the admissibility of former testimony. One such
situation may arise when a deposition is taken for discovery purposes,
but is later offered into evidence as former testimony. In situations
where depositions are taken only as "fishing expeditions," the opponent
may wish to forego thorough cross-examination at the discovery stage
so as to not prematurely reveal weaknesses in either the witness'
testimony or the adverse party's case.7 6 The opponent's purpose of
examination would thus be substantially different from his purpose of
examining at trial. However valid such reasoning might be in some
jurisdictions for excluding depositions, the purpose of the examination
would not appear to be an important factor in federal courts. This
is a consequence of the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32
makes no distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions.7
The prudent attorney must therefore cross-examine all deponents as
if their statements are to be offered as evidence.
e. Stakes Differ
Another factor influencing the decision by counsel whether to con-
duct examination so as to elicit every relevant fact is that suggested
by the term "stakes." A substantial difference in what is at risk in
the litigation affects the incentive to develop testimony fully.78 If, for
example, it would cost 500 dollars to make the investigation necessary
to cross-examine a witness thoroughly, a defendant might well forego
the investigation and the thorough cross-examination in a suit involv-
ing only 2,000 dollars, while a different conclusion would be reached if
he has 20,000 dollars at risk. Thus, if testimony from the former suit
were offered in the latter action arising from the same facts, the op-
ponent would have a good argument against its admissibility. There
may be a countervailing factor, however. If the opponent in the first
action can reasonably foresee the second action, the possible applica-
bility of preclusion or collateral estoppel doctrines means that the true
amount at risk, in terms of the incentive to develop the testimony, is
not 2,000 but 22,000 dollars.
76 See 7 CAL. T, REvioN ComfN, Hearsay Evidence 124 ; Naw JERSEy SuPmmE
CoDmT Comm. oN EviDENCE, REPORT 139-40 (1963).
77 See text accompanying notes 33-35 s'upra.
78 See Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 52,
at 1206; cf. A. VESTAL, Rs JUDIcATA/PREcLusION 200 (1969).
The differing stakes may be of a penal, as well as a financial, nature. See
Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 154, 46 So. 2d 837, 843 (1950) (the court, in ad-
mitting former testimony, failed to take cognizance of the difference between
the penalties for violation of a peace bond and for rape).
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Evaluating the difference in stakes between criminal and civil ac-
tions poses another problem. It might be argued that any criminal
sanction provides the maximum incentive to examine. An important
question, however, is whether there might not be a significant differ-
ence between a traffic prosecution with a penalty of "100 dollars or
10 days" and a personad injury claim for 100,000 dollars arising out
of the same facts.
f. Tribunal Differs
In those situations in which an action will be tried de novo in an-
other tribunal, a party might not develop testimony as thoroughly as
he would otherwise because of the "second chance" provided by the
de novo hearing. While the amount or object at risk may be the same
in each hearing, the risk itself will be different. This argument could
be used to exclude former testimony when, for example, such testi-
mony taken at a justice court trial is offered at a second hearing in
the court of general jurisdiction,79 or when testimony is given at a bar
association hearing and offered at the subsequent judicial proceeding
for disbarmnent.Y° In making the choice, however, between holding the
opponent to the former examination and losing the testimony entirely,
it arguably does no violence to the notion of fairness to say that the
possibility of a new hearing is not by itself a significant reason for not
eliciting the relevant facts.
g. .Burden of Proof Differs
Another factor which might affect the development of testimony is
placement of the burden of proof in the respective hearings. The
argument for barring former testimony on this ground is based upon
the consideration that the party upon whom is placed the risk of non-
persuasion has a greater incentive both to develop his case on direct
examination and to weaken the opponent's case on cross-examination.
Conversely, the opponent need not be so thorough in bringing forth
relevant evidence because he has less to prove in order to prevail.
Therefore, the opponent with the onus in the present hearing should
not be held to the examination by one without that burden in the prior
hearing. Such an argument, however, is based upon the unverified
assumption that the burden of proof is in fact a consideration of the
70See IowA CODE § 601.91 (1971); WASm REv. CoDE § 12.36.050 (1956).80 See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Sackett, 231 La. 655, 662, 92 So. 2d 571, 573
(1957). The strict former testimony rules are sometimes relaxed in bar dis-
ciplinary proceedings on the theory that grievance committee hearings are not
usual adversary actions, but part of process by which '%minor professional de-
viations are disposed of justly without public embarrassment" Id. at 662, 92 So.
2d at 573; Armitage v. Bar Eules Comm, 223 Ark 465. 467, 266 S.W. 2d 818, 820
(1954).
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reasonable attorney in conducting his examination. It is probable that
only in a very rare instance would that consideration be a major fac-
tor-the "stakes" involved in the proceeding is likely to be a substan-
tially greater influence on the tactical judgment. Because of the minor
importance of this factor in the conduct of a cross-examination, then,
the burden-of-proof argument should not be accepted as a sufficient
reason for failure to elicit the relevant facts. Such a result would be
in accord with that reached in the leading case of Travelers Fire
Insurance Company v. Wright.81 There, X and Y testified for the State
in an arson prosecution against A. Later, when A and his partner, B,
sued the fire insurer on the insurance contract for losses incurred in
the destruction of the premises, X and Y claimed their self-incrimina-
tion privilege and refused to testify. Their former testimony was then
offered into evidence by the insurer, but was excluded by the trial
court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that it was error to
exclude the testimony, pointing out that A had the same motive and
opportunity in the cross-examination at the criminal action. Further-
more, and more important to this analysis, the court failed to mention
the differing burdens in the two actions.8 2
IH. FoimE TESTimoNy Omasu AGAINST ITS PROPONENT
The former testimony exception in the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence permits the admission of testimony given "at the instance of
... a party with an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct...
or redirect examination, with motive and interest similar to those of
the party against whom now offered."83 Thus, if A directly examines
W in A's suit against B, C may introduce W's testimony in an action
against A, assuming W is unavailable and A had motive and interest
in conducting the examination on the former occasion similar to that
81322 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1958).
82 Id. at 421-22.
8 3FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1). The import of the language "or redirect" in this
provision is not clear since a party would rarely be entitled to redirect examina-
tion without having participated in the direct examination. If, as the Notes to
the Rule would seem to imply, the admissibility of former testimony against its
proponent is based on the theory that "direct and redirect examination of one's
own witness [is] the equivalent of cross-examinaton .. . 21 FED. R. EviD. 804(b)
(1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127, it would seem that the Rule should pro-
vide, in pertinent part, "direct and redirect examination, or cross-examination
S.. ." The inclusion of the requirement of the opportunity to develop testimony
by direct and redirect would appear to be of some significance under the pro-
posed rules; redirect examination is almost always limited to new matters
brought out on cross-examination, see McCormcx § 32, but the proposed Rules
allow cross-examination "on any matter relevant to any issue in the case ...
FED. R. Evm. 611(b).
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he would have in the present hearing. Establishing the rationale for
admission of the former testimony is somewhat more difficult when the
present opponent was formerly the proponent of the testimony than
when he has been opponent both times. In the latter situation the
opponent at least has had the opportunity to test the declarant's story
by cross-examination, but in the former case there has never been any
cross-examination by the opponent.
One model for holdiag the testimony admissible against the former
proponent would be that of treating such former testimony as an adop-
tive admission. Under this concept a party is precluded from objecting
to his lack of opportumity to cross-examine the witness' statement
because he has "manifested his adoption or belief in its truth."8 4 State-
ments deemed to be within this doctrine are admissible under the
Federal Rules as a result of the nature of the adversary system rather
than because they satisfy the usual necessity or trustworthiness con-
ditions for exceptions t the hearsay ruleY5 It is, however, illogical to
admit former testimony under the adoptive-admissions theory. Since,
in practice, parties frequently have little choice in selecting their
witnesses, it is unrealistic to say that the party has manifested his
belief in the witness' veracity. The concept that a party makes a
witness his own and vouches for his credibility has been discarded in
other areas and certainly should have no place here. 6
The alternative to the adoptive-admission concept is, as the drafters
of the Federal Rules Etate, "simply to recognize direct and redirect
examination of one's own witness as the equivalent of cross-examining
an opponent's witness.'"17 The theory that direct and redirect exami-
nation could be equivalent to cross-examination would, however, cer-
tainly be fallacious under the common law in most jurisdictions. Un-
der common law, two primary techniques which have been permitted
on cross-examination but not generally on direct are leading ques-
tions and impeachme,2t.8 9 The availability of these techniques can
be a significant advantage to the cross-examiner. A recently published
study suggests that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, leading ques-
tions can produce testimony equally as accurate as and substantially
84FE. R. EvmD. 801(d) (2) (ii); see FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Commit-
tee's Note, at 127.85 FED. R. Evm. 801(d) (2), Advisory Committee's Note, at 103.
8 6 See generally FE. R. Evm. 607 & Advisory Committee's Note, at 74.
87 FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127. See aLso Feld-
stein v. Harrington, 4 Wis. 2d 380, 387, 90 N.W. 2d 566, 570 (1958); Powers, supra
note 37, at 303-04.
88 See McCoRmc § 6.
So See McCowunC § 38.
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more complete than that produced by nonleading questions." In
addition, the ability to attack the witness' credibility may also be an
advantage when facing an opponent who is limited to contradiction by
contrary evidence.
Such differences as to techniques available to the cross-examiner
and those which may be utilized by the direct examiner have beenminimized under the proposed Federal Rules. The advantages to the
cross-examiner accruing under common-law rules against leading
questions and impeaching one's own witness have in fact been fairly
well obviated in the proposed Rules. Since the notion that a party
selects and vouches for his own witnesses has been rejected, the cred-
ibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him.A As a result, the direct examiner is no longer at the
mercy of a witness whose testimony at trial is different from his pre-
trial account. Although the Rules still advise against the use of lead-
ing questions on direct examination, such questions are permitted
when necessary to develop the testimony.92 By this proviso, the direct
examiner is put on an equal footing with the cross-examiner when
faced with a hostile, forgetful, or mentally deficient witness. On their
face, then, the Rules appear to make direct examination the equivalent
of cross-examination, 3 so that a party permitted the former at a prior
hearing cannot complain that the denial of the right to cross-examina-
tion should result in the admissibility of the former testimony.
This equivalence is illustrated in Dwyer v. State 4 a case in which
the petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis on the ground that
his 1937 guilty plea and conviction of murder were the result of duress
and intimidation by one Carroll. In 1938, Carroll had been tried and
convicted of the same murder. The petitioner's counsel in the 1937
proceeding, Abbott, testified for the State in the Carroll trial. Abbott
had died prior to the coram nobis proceeding in 1957, so the petitioner
sought to introduce his testimony from the Carroll trial, since it was
relevant to the charges in the writ of error. The testimony was ex-
cluded by the trial court on the ground that neither the parties nor
the issues were the same in the Carroll trial as in the present proceed-
ing. Exceptions to this ruling were sustained by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Maine, which found that the record of the Carroll trial
conclusively demonstrated that the State had assumed the dual burden
90 M1arsha, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kinds of Question and Atmosphere
of Interrogation oan Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARv. L. RV.
1620, 1628-29, 1636 (1971). But see McCoRmcK § 6, at 9.
91 Fm. R. Evm. 607.92FED. P, Evn). 611 (c).
93 See FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127. See general-
ly FED. R. Evi. 607, 611 C), 801(d) (1).
9, 154 Me. 179, 145 A2d 100 (1958).
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of exculpating the petitioner while convicting Carroll, and that "the
former effort was logically and correlatively necessary to the latter
because of the extraordinary nature of the trial"' 5 Abbot's testimony
upon direct examination by the State in the Carroll trial on the same
issues as those raised in the coram -obis proceeding was held to
preclude the State from complaining of a lack of opportunity to
cross-examine.
In a case such as Dzwjer it would appear proper to equate the direct
examination with an opportunity for cross-examnination. Where the
witness is helping the direct examiner build his case, the testimony is
being developed as the examiner wishes and there is no problem of the
examiner's having to protect himself. While the analogy to admissions
is not perfect, the same policy considerations would seem to militate
against the examiner's efforts to exclude the testimony later.
There can be circumstances, however, in which this common interest
between the direct examiner and his witness may have been absent at
the prior trial. In such cases it becomes pertinent, in deciding whether
to hold the opponent to his former direct examination, to consider if
he is as well able to protect himself by direct as by cross-examination.
Consider, for example, this situation: A sues B for injuries incurred in
an auto accident. W and X are occurrence witnesses, so A must pro-
duce both if the jury is not to make unfavorable inferences about his
case."0 A knows X will not make a good witness, so the case is devel-
oped mainly through W. When X is examined he gives damaging
testimony, as was expected. The usual technique for a direct examiner
is to conclude his direct examination of the unfavorable witness as
soon as possible, before his whole case is brought down in the eyes of
the jury.0 7 If, however, X were being cross-examined and were -to
give testimony favorable to the opponent, the cross-examiner could
continue to probe for weaknesses and look for facts favorable to his
case without much fear that he was losing his whole case by an un-
successful cross-examination. 9 In other words, given the motive and
05 Id at 182, 145 A.2d at 12.
06 A. MoRRnLL, supra note 62, § 3.35, at 50.
07 See id. §§ 3.7, 3.34, at 34-36, 49-50. The argument made above does not, of
course, apply to direct examination in a deposition, since the jury is not present.
In addition, the emphasis on. pretrial discovery promotes probing by the direct
examiner. Regardless of the former testimony rules, a deposition previously of-
fered in evidence is admissible against its proponent as an adoptive admission.
See FE. R. Evm. 801(d) (2) (ii); McCoreacK § 246, at 526-27.08 Circumstances promoting full development of even unfavorable cross-exami-
nation include: (1) the jury expects the witness to begin answering unfavorably
to the cross-examiner; (2) it is sometimes advantageous to build up unfavorable
testimony, so as to make ixrpeachment (e.g., by prior inconsistent statements)
more effective, see id. §§ 4.2)-.30, at 64-68; (3) even if cross-examination goes
badly on the facts of the casa, attempts to impeach will not create the negative
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interest to bring out the same facts, the tactics of direct and cross-exam-
iners may be very different when they are faced with a damaging
witness, as is the case when testimony is offered against its former pro-
ponent; the latter may in fact develop the testimony, while the former
would make the tactical decision not to do so. Thus, the Advisory
Committee's Note that "[a]n even less appealing argument [than the
lack of equal techniques] is presented when failure to develop fully
was the result of a deliberate choice" 99 fails to take into account the
fact that in reality a proponent cannot attack 'or develop the testimony
of his own damaging witness in the same way as would be the case if
the witness were the opponent's. Unless the "motive and interest"
concept is intended to include consideration of these tactical points-a
conclusion contrary to the implication of the Note--direct examination
cannot be fully equated with cross-examination in these circumstances.
Nevertheless, such a conclusion cannot end the inquiry because it
may be, as indicated by the Note, that "fairness allows imposing, upon
the party against whom now offered, the handling of the witness in the
earlier occasion."'100 It appears that, at least in the situation where
the present opponent was direct examiner of the witness, fairness is
satisfied when the prior testimony is admitted. The direct examina-
tion may not be the full equivalent of cross-examination, but it does
provide an equal opportunity to develop the facts. The practical con-
sideration that this opportunity will not be utilized in many cases
should only go to the weight of the evidence in the second hearing;
the opponent can always argue this point to the trier. Even if the
direct examination is not the full equivalent of the cross-examination,
the evidence elicited is still far superior in terms of reliability to that
admitted under other hearsay exceptions.10 '
One further consideration in the analysis of former testimony
offered against its proponent is that although the Advisory Committee's
reaction in the jury, so the cross-examiner can feel freer to bring out factual
testimony. See also id. § 3.36(2), at 51.99FED. X. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127.
100 Id.
101 See generally Editorial Note, Some Hearsay Exceptions in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence and New Jersey Evidence Law, 9 RuTEas L Rzv. 555, 558-59
(1955). If a witness is favorable to the direct examiner, as the leading-question
rule posits, it may be argued that unfavorable testimony provides its own cir-
cumstantial probability of truthworthiness. However, this argument again in-
volves an assumption that parties have power to select their own witnesses, when
actually they have little choice among favoring, disfavoring, and indifferent wit-
nesses. The one element likely to be in the direct examiner's favor is his op-
portunity to prepare his case and, perhaps, develop rapport with his witnesses.
This should minimize the occasions on which he has to cut his direct examination
short-and it might be argued that the circumstance in which he must make that
tactical decision is almost entirely attributable to his faulty preparation.
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Note indicates that the part of the former testimony exception here
under consideration applies only to such testimony offered against a
party by whom it was originally procured,10 2 the terms of the Rule are
not so limited. Specifically, the Rule permits admission of the testi-
mony against any parly-whether or not that party originally offered
the testimony-so long as such testimony was originally offered on
behalf of a party with motive and interest to develop it by direct and
redirect examination similar to that which the present opponent would
have in cross-examining. 10 3 For example, assume that A and B were
injured in an accident involving C's bus. A first brings his negligence
action against C and calls W as a witness to the circumstances of the
crash. W gives testimony which is favorable to C. When B later
alleges the sames negligence in a suit against C, C wants to use the
testimony of W, who is by then unavailable. Rule 804(b) (1) indicates
that the testimony is admissible against B, since his interest in cross-
examining was the same as A's upon direct examination. However,
this seems unfair to B, and the Note would appear to preclude such an
occurrence. The practical restrictions on attacking one's own witness
mean that W's testimony was never really subject to any adversarial
testing; A was not about to ruin his case in the jury's eyes by attack-
ing his own witness, and since C was entirely happy with the result on
direct, he did not choose to cross-examine. When the proponent in the
first action is the opponent in the second, it seems fair to charge him
with faulty preparation of his case, but a new opponent like B should
not have to pay for his predecessor's mistakzes. The situation is
distinguishable from the case where the testimony is offered in the
second hearing against a party with motive and interest similar to the
opponent in the first, since the circumstances of cross-examination are
such as to promote full development of even unfavorable testimony,
while direct examination by its nature inhibits deep exploration of
unproductive evidence.
IV. THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT:
A CONsTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In Wigmore's view, hearsay must not only possess some indicia of
reliability to come within an exception to the exclusionary rule, but
102 Fm. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127.
103 Fm. R. Evm. 804(b) (1). Professor Falknor's formulation would admit for-
mer testimony only when
(i) the testimony is offered against a party who offered it in his own be-
half on the former occasion, or against the successor in interest of such
party, or (ii) the testimony is offered against a party against whom, or
against whose predecessor in interest, it was offered on the former oc-
casion. Falkmor, The 1rearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.LAL. Rv.
43, 58 (1954) (emphasL. added).
Accord, WAsH. Civ. R. 43(i,.
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must also be shown to be necessary, in that unless the evidence is ac-
cepted untested by present cross-examination, its benefit will be lost
entirely. 0 4 The necessity element of the former-testimony exception
is traditionally supplied by the requirement that the declarant be un-
available at the present hearing. Such unavailability can generally be
established by showing the declarant's death, 05 absence from the juris-
diction, 0 6 or physical'0" or mental incapacityW 0 to testify. Failure of
memory,0 9 supervening incompetency,"0 and exercise of privilege" 1
have also been accepted as establishing sufficient unavailability."'
Unlike the common law, Federal Rule 804 (a) states the same
unavailability criteria for all hearsay exceptions having the necessity
requirement. 1 ' Such criteria include all of the situations mentioned
above, as well as that involving a declarant who persists in a refusal,
for any reason, to testify." 4 The curious matter in the present context
is not the particular listing of situations constituting unavailability,
but the fact that the requirement was imposed at all in the case of the
former-testimony exception. 15 The Advisory Committee's Note does
recognize that former testimony may be the most reliable type of
1.04 5 WIGBIoRE § 1421.
105 FED. R. EvD. 804(a) (4), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; 5 WIGBIoPE §
1403. This reason is deemed sufficient in almost all jurisdictions. See 5 WiGmoRE
§ 1403.
' 0 See FED. R. Evm. 804 (a) (5), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; 5 WIGLORE
§ 1404(a). This reason is based on the impossibility of compelling the witness'
attendance. Sometimes permanent or indefinite absence is required, but the
better view imposes no such limitation. FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (5); see 5 WIGoRE
§ 1404(a). Some courts have required that the absent witness' deposition be
taken by commission. See 5 WIGmopm § 1404(c). Such a rule requires evidence
which is no more than equal (if that) to former testimony. See Glicksberg, supra
note 37, at 281; A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois
Evidence Law, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 481, 495 (1954).
10 7 See F=. I. EvmD. 804(a) (4), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; 5 WIGLoRE
§ 1406.
'08See FE. R. EvIm. 804(a) (4), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; 5 WiCmoRE
§ 1408.
' 09 See McCoaLcK § 26, at 494-95; Annot, 129 A.L.R. 843, 845 (1940).
10 See FED. R. EvIm. 804(a) (3), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; McCoP cK
§ 234, at 494-95.
"' See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968) (dictum); Ed-
monds v. United States, 273 F.2d 108, 112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (privilege against
self-incrimination), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1960); FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (1),
Advisory Committee's Note, at 126; McCowncK § 234, at 495; Annot., 45 A.LR.2d
1354 (1956).
"'2 See McCoimicK § 234; WiGmioRE §§ 1401-10.
1 See FED. R. EviD. 804(a) & Advisory Committee's Note, at 125.
"14 See generally Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 L. & SociAL ORDER 591, 609-10.
"5 Compare FED. R. Evm. 804(b) with FED. R. Evm. 803, for the types of hear-
say exceptions in which unavailability is, and is not, required.
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hearsay in view of the fact that of the three reliability factors previous-
ly discussed, both the oath and cross-examination functions are satis-
fied, and it lacks only the demeanor element, a deficiency common to
all the hearsay exceptions. 11  Nevertheless, the drafters classified the
exception with other exceptions requiring a showing of necessity on
the grounds that the "'opportunity to observe demeanor is what in
large measure confers depth and meaning upon oath and cross-exam-
ination," and "[i]n any event, the tradition, founded in experience,
uniformly favors production of the witness if he is available.""' 7
The first basis given for the treatment of the exception in the Fed-
eral Rules, that it is demeanor which gives depth and meaning to oath
and cross-examination, seems to be an overstatement of the case. The
primary value of demeanor evidence is as an indication of the witness'
sincerity,"8 while cross-examination serves to expose the more fre-
quent problems of weaknesses in perception and memory as well.'
Even to the extent that. demeanor is a factor bearing upon these latter
aspects of testimonial reliability, its own trustworthiness is open to
question. The experimental evidence is at best inconclusive; 20 the
fact that witnesses are frequently "coached" on their demeanor' 2'
should lead to a skepticism of its reliability. On the whole, the Com-
mittee has not made a persuasive case to support the conclusions that
former testimony is clearly "not equal in quality to testimony of the
declarant on the stand"'12 2 or that it has more in common with dying
declarations than with excited utterances. 2  Rather than belabor the
point, however-for the case against the tradition has been made fully
elsewhere' 2 4-the major concern of this analysis is an inquiry into
whether the drafters would have been free to remove the requirement
in criminal cases had they chosen to do so. Specifically, the question
is whether the unavailability requirement is constitutionally compelled.
It is possible that the Committee's decision to retain the unavailability
requirement was made, at least in part, because of recent expressions
by the Supreme Court which can be read to require such a result.
110 FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126.
11"7 I.
18 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77,
80 (2d Cir. 1949); Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Impon-
derables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580, 580-81 (1961).
119 See Morgan, supra note 15, at 188.20 See Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. Csm. L.C. 5, 24-25 (1925); Stewart,
Perception, Memory and H.earsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
Rules of Evidence, 1970 UuAH L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1970).
121 See A. MomuRL, supra. note 62, §§ 3.5-13, at 33-39.
' 22 See FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126.
,23 See FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 126.
12 4 See McCoaRmc § 238.
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Whether such a reading is correct is the issue to which this analysis
now turns.
A. The Constitutional Issue
In Mattox v. United States25 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that former testimony admissible under the common-law
exception did not violate the sixth amendment right of a criminal
defendant to be "confronted with the witnesses against him. '126 In spite
of this imprimatur, former testimony depends for its credibility on an
out-of-court declarant, so any changes in the common-law application
of the former-testimony exception must be tested against the confron-
tation clause. The relatively few Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the confrontation clause have been most frequently concerned with
the former-testimony exception 27 but, unfortunately for present pur-
poses, no clearly consistent statement of confrontation principles has
emerged, and the scope of the discussions seems usually to be circum-
scribed by the particular common-law hearsay exception under
review. Thus, it is very difficult to predict Court reaction to proposed
changes in the common-law hearsay rules, such as the removal of the
unavailability requirement from the former-testimony exception. The
analysis which follows will attempt to provide a basis for interpreting
proposed changes in hearsay rules by first considering the confronta-
tion right in general and as applied in particular to former testimony,
and then by suggesting manageable constitutional standards for testing
new exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Since the historical evidence
of the intentions of the Framers in this area is inconclusive,'22 the
125156 U.S. 237 (1895).
126 156 U.S. at 240-44 (1895). The sixth amendment confrontation right was
held to apply to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400, 406 (1965).
127The former testimony and co-conspirator's admission exceptions are the
only ones which have been upheld by the Supreme Court against direct sixth
amendment attack. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1970) (co-
conspirator's admission); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 170 (1970) (former
testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (former testi-
mony); cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968) (dictum) (former testi-
mony); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dictum) (former testimony).
There is also occasional dicta supporting admission of dying declarations and
documentary evidence. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dy-
ing declarations); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (documentary
evidence); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548-49 (1926) (documentary
evidence); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (dying declara-
tions). Generally, the Supreme Court has upheld the traditional hearsay excep-
tions. See Note, Constitutional Law-The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Excep-
tions: An Uncertain Standard, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 580, 582-83 (1971).
128 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-75 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evi-
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analysis will depend largely upon an examination of the few decisions
in the area and upon considerations of general policy.
1. Constitutional Confrontation
Literal compliance with the confrontation clause would, of course,
exclude all hearsay evidence.129 In Mattox the Court noted,
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes ad-
mitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a per-
sonal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief.1 30
However, the Court indicated that such a rule is not absolute, stating
that "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."' 31
The former testimony involved in the case was an example of such an
occasion: "[T]he rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed" by
letting a criminal, already convicted once, "go scot free simply because
death had closed the mouth" of a witness. 32 Similarly, dying declara-
tions are admissible "not in conformity with any general rule regarding
the admission of testimony," but simply "to prevent a manifest failure
of justice" where the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement ensure its reliability."33 Mattox thus makes it clear that
the confrontation right is subject to at least some exceptions, but it
does not specify all such exceptions.
One immediately appealing hypothesis is that the confrontation
clause incorporates the common-law hearsay rule and its exceptions." 4
This hypothesis is based upon Wigmore's view that the primary pur-
pose of confrontation is to guarantee the opponent the right of cross-
examination, and that the secondary purpose of physical confrontation
is not categorically required."35 Since both the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause have the same primary purpose of ensuring the
dance in Criminal Trials, 1.3 U. PA. L. RLv. 741, 743 (1965); Note, Constitutional
Law-The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncertain Standard,
supra note 127, at 582.
1,20 But see Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation, supra note 128, at 742;
19 KAx. L. Rnv. 533, 533-39 (1971).
10 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (:1895).
is, Id. at 243.
/S" Id.
"'3 Id. at 243-44.
14 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
235 See 5 WiGLoRE § 1395.
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right of cross-examination, it is argued that they have the same bound-
aries. However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly
deny this equivalence. As the Court stated in California v. Green:
Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we havemore than once found a violation of confrontation values even though
the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hear-
say exception .... The converse is equally true: merely because
evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule doesnot lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have beendenied.13
2. Unavailzbility and the Recent Confrontation Cases
If the common-law hearsay rule and its exceptions are not con-
stitutionally required by the confrontation clause, the former testi-
mony exception is not ipso facto immutable. The Supreme Court
13 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-83 (1970).
Some other confrontation theories which have been argued to be applicable in
hearsay evidence situations include: (1) The confrontation clause guarantees
only the right to face all witnesses present in court. See California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Note, Preserving the Right to
Confrontation, supra note 128, at 742-43. However, the out-of-court declarant is
equally a "witness" against the accused and the same protection is necessary.
(2) The confrontation clause guarantees a right to cross-examine the witness
at some stage of the proceedings. See Note, Constitutional Law-The Confron-
tation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncertain Standard, supra note 127, at
591; 32 OHIo ST. L. J. 188, 193 (1971). This theory is premised on the Court's
suggestion in California v. Green, that full and effective cross-examination is at
the core of the confrontation right. 399 U.S. at 157-58. Further support for this
theory is found in the emphasis on cross-examination in several recent hearsay-
confrontation decisions, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 157-58; Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965), but such emphasis is probably a
function of the fact that the cases, with the exception of the Douglas case,
involved the former testimony exception in which prior cross-examination is
always a consideration. (3) The Douglas exception involved a situation where
the prosecutor, under the guise of examining the accused's alleged accomplice,
read a confession by the accomplice which implicated the accused. The Supreme
Court held that since the accomplice persisted in claiming his privilege against
self-incrimination, the prosecutor's act violated the accused's right to confron-
tation. 380 U.S. at 418-20. Douglas thus suggests that the confrontation clause
is designed to enforce certain standards of prosecutorial conduct. Cf. 19 KAxs.
L. REv. 533, 534-35 (1971); 49 N.CL.. REv. 788, 795 (1971). This prosecutorial
standard is also suggested in cases requiring a good-faith effort to produce the
declarant of former testimony. See California v. Green, supra at 180; Barber v.
Page, supra at 724-25. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970), the Court
mentioned the lack of prosecutorial misconduct as a reason for distinguishing that
case from Barber. However, such a standard seems to be more a component of
due process than of the fairly explicit confrontation clause. cf. Note, Constitu-
tional Law-The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncertain
Standard, supra note 127, at 582.
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decision in Barber v. P~tge137 suggests the existence of a confrontation
question if the unavailability requirement is waived. The petitioner
in that case had been jointly indicted along with one Woods and an-
other for armed robbery. At the preliminary hearing Woods waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and gave testimony implicating
the petitioner. At the -time the petitioner was brought to trial, Woods
was in a federal penitentiary 225 miles away in a neighboring state.
The Supreme Court held that Woods' preliminary hearing testimony
had been admitted in violation of the petitioner's confrontation right
because there was no showing that the State had made any attempt
to secure Woods' presence at the trial. The Court ruled that
a witness is not, "unavailable" for purposes of the foregoing exception
to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities
have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. The State
made no such effort here .. .. The right of confrontation may not be
dispensed with so lightly.j 3 s
In spite of this explicit language in a decision less than 5 years
old, it can be argued that the opinions in two more recent cases have
left the door open to the abandonment of the unavailability require-
ment for former testimony. The more recent of the two cases, Dutton
v. Evans,13' inferably indicates that unavailability is not a confronta-
tion requirement for hearsay exceptions generally, and the discussion
of confrontation policy in California v. Green4 permits a like con-
clusion regarding former testimony specifically.
a. Dutton v. Evans
In Evans the defendamt was fried for the murder of a policeman.
Part of the evidence offered by the State was a statement allegedly
made by a co-conspirator after his arraignment which implicated the
137 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
'13.Id. at 724-25. The State's argument of unavailability was based solely on
the fact the declarant was outside the jurisdiction. Id. at 722. See also 5 WiGMoRE
§ 1404. The Court indicated1 that through increased inter-jurisdictional coopera-
tion that theory had been Largely deprived of any validity which it might pre-
viously have had. 390 U.S. at 723. Specific reference was made to the authority
of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum and to the
policy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to permit federal prisoners to testify
pursuant to such writs issued by state courts. Id. at 723-24. For witnesses not
in prison, the Uniform Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without
a State in Criminal Proceedings is in effect in at least fourty-five states. UNwoRu
ACT TO SECURE THE ATrmNDwcE oF WITNEss FRoM WrrHoUr A STATE IN CRnMn.AL
PocEEDns, 9 UNIFORMi LAWS ANN. 50 (Supp. 1967); see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 723 n.4 (1968); Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434,
1440 (1966).
130 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
140 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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defendant. Under the Georgia rule the "admissions of a co-conspirator"'
exception to the hearsay rule includes statements made not only in
furtherance of the principal objects of the conspiracy, but also state-
ments made in an attempt to conceal the existence of the crime or the
identity of its perpetrators.'41 The Court held that the Georgia rule,
although broader than the common-law exception,'42 did not violate
the confrontation clause. 43 In reaching that conclusion, no attention
*was given in the plurality or concurring opinions to the fact that the
State had made no showing of any attempt to secure the declarant-co-
conspirator's presence.'44 Thus, the availability of the declarant might
not, by itself, be a ground for constitutional objection.
b. California v. Green
The majority opinion in California v. Green 45 provides the primary
basis for the conclusion here advanced that the unavailability require-
ment is not constitutionally compelled. In that case the State's
principal witness had testified at a preliminary hearing that the accused
had supplied him with narcotics by showing him where to pick up
some bags of marijuana to sell. However, at the trial the witness was
markedly evasive and uncooperative, claiming he was uncertain as to
how he received the marijuana because he had been under the
influence of LSD and was unable to distinguish fact from fantasy.' 46 His
preliminary hearing testimony was then offered and admitted 47 pur-
suant to a California statute which made prior inconsistent statements
admissible as substantive evidence. 48 The conviction was reversed by
'4' See Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 401-02, 150 S.Et2d 240, 248 (1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 953 (1966).4 2 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79, 106 (1970). For further discussion of this
exception, see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); FzD. R. Evm.
801(d) (2) (v); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, A Reexamination of the Co-Con-
spirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mcx. L. Ray. 1159, 1167-75 (1954).
143 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83 (1970).
144 Compare Note, Constitutional Law-The Confrontation Test for Hearsay
Exceptions: An Uncertain Standard, supra note 127, at 590-91, and 400 U.S. at
102 (Marshall, Black, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The plurality opinion
in Evans was written by Mr. Justice Stewart, for the Chief Justice and Justices
White and Blackmun, id. at 76; Chief Justice Burger also joined in a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun, id. at 90; Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the
result, id. at 93.
"-5 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
146 Id. at 152.
147 Id.
us CAL. EviD. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). For the comparable Proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence, see FED. R. Evn. 801(d) (1) (ii). See also McCoPmcK § 39.
As the Federal Rules were first drafted, former testimony given under oath at
a trial, hearing, or grand jury proceeding by a declarant present and testding
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the California District Court of Appeal on the ground that substantive
admission of the prior inconsistent statement denied the accused his
right of confrontation,1 4 0 and that latter decision was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court. 50 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding the preliminary hearing testimony admissible on either
of two grounds. FirsL, the Court held that since the witness making
the prior inconsistent statement was subject to in-court cross-examina-
tion, the requirements of the confrontation clause was satisfied. The
witness was forced to take a position confirming or denying his
previous statement and, therefore, the trier had an opportunity to
observe the cross-emunination and the witness' demeanor. This
opportunity was thought to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.""1 The second basis
for the decision was that the out-of-court statement was "given under
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical
trial" since the witness was under oath, the accused was represented
by counsel and had every opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal which
could provide a record of the proceeding. 51 If the witness had
actually been unavailable, prior decisions would appear to make it
clear that testimony given in such circumstances would be admissible.
Therefore, the Court believed it
untenable to construe the Confrontation Clause to permit the use of prior
testimony to prove the State's case where the declarant never appears,
but to bar that testimony where the declarant is present at trial, exposed
to the defendant and the trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination. 53
The Court then continued with language which may be read as per-
mitting abandonment of the unavailability requirement, although there
is admittedly no direct indication that it considered such a possibility.
Pointing out that the State had made every effort to introduce its
would be admissible, since it was excluded from the definition of hearsay. FED.
R. Evm. 8-01(c) (2) (iv) (Prelim. Draft 1969). This provision was criticized, see
Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 52, at 1094-95,
and deleted from the Revised Draft. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d) (1).
149 People v. Green, 71 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1968), vacated,
70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
10 People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654 665-66, 451 P2d 422, 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782,
789 (1969).
1 1 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). The Court rejected the argu-
ment that belated cross-examination could never be a constitutionally adequate
substitute for cross-examination contemporaneous with the making of the state-
ment. Id. at 159-60. But see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr.
599, 605-06, 441 P.2d 111, 117-18 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); cf.
Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 380, 388 n.3 (Cust. Ct.
1959); 5 WIG0iom § 1368, at 34.
152 399 U.S. at 165.
253 Id. at 166-67.
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evidence through the testimony of a live witness by producing him
for trial, swearing hin. and tendering him for cross-examination, the
Court stated:
Whether [the witness] then testified in a manner consistent or incon-
sistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, claimed a loss of memory,claimed his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or simply re-fused to answer, nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State
from also relying on his prior testimony to prove its case against [the
accusedl.15,
In terms of confrontation interests,5 5 there thus seems to be no
significant difference between the declarant who has given former
testimony and is now present in court but claims loss of memory or
just refuses to testify, and the one who is available but not present in
court. In each case the prior testimony has been given under oath and
the witness has been subject to cross-examination. The remaining
aspect of the confrontation interest which gives the accused the right
to meet his accuser face-to-face, in order that the witness' conscience
be pricked, 58 is satisfied in each case at the time of the prior testi-
mony. The only aspect of confrontation possibly different is the op-
portunity of the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the witness
while he is testifying. As the Court suggested in Green, when the in-
court witness subsequently affirms or denies a prior inconsistent state-
ment, his demeanor in taking a position may be of assistance to the
trier of fact in evaluating the weight to be given the prior statement.15 7
However, when the witness claims a loss of memory or refuses to
answer, his demeanor can be of little, if any, assistance in evaluating
his former testimony. Thus, when the Court says the former testi-
mony is admissible even though the witness cannot be effectively exam-
ined as to that testimony in the presence of the trier of fact, it is
saying that the reliability of former testimony is such that demeanor
evidence is not necessary to evaluate the reliability and that "the right
of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compliance
with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement."'58
154 Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added).
'55 Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness wil give his statementsunder oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter andguarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2)
forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" [5 WIGmoPE § 1367];(3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe thedemeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury inassessing his credibility. California v. Green, 399 US. 149, 158 (1970).
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); 5 Wr~oE § 1395.156 Wigmore suggests that this aspect is a function of the witness' presence
before the tribunal, rather than because he is facing the accused. 5 WmaoaE §
1395, at 126-27.
157 399 U.S. at 160. For an opposing view, see id. at 193 (dissenting opinion).
158 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968); see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
192-93 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
19721
HeinOnline  -- 57 Iowa L. Rev. 579 1971-1972
IOWA LAW REVIEW
Since the Court has thus said in Green that the former testimony
will be admissible when the witness is present, regardless of whether
any confrontation interest will be promoted by his presence, it would
appear to serve no useful purpose to require the prosecution to make
any effort to secure that presence. The situation would be different,
for confrontation purposes, if the rule were that former testimony of
an available witness was admissible only when the trier had a mean-
ingful opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor. However, such
is not the rule, and the Court in Green has gone even beyond the Wig-
morean notion that the demeanor aspect of confrontation is secondary
to the cross-examination aspect, in that the former will not be insisted
upon when the witness is unavailable. The inference to be drawn
from Green is that opportunity to observe demeanor will not be re-
quired even when the witness is available. It may thus be concluded
that as far as former testimony is concerned, the demeanor aspect of
confrontation has no importance at all when the other aspects are
satisfied.
The opinion in Green does not, of course, explicitly hold that
unavailability is not a constitutional requisite for the admissibility of
former testimony. The Court's conclusion that prior testimony is
admissible when the declarant is present was based upon its admissi-
bility in a situation where the witness is shown to be actually unavail-
able 150 The opinion also speaks of the State's "'need' to introduce
relevant testimony that through no fault of its own cannot be intro-
duced in any other way."'060 As the opinion makes clear, the need for
the out-of-court testimony has no effect on its reliability; it can only
be a requirement to promote other confrontation interests.' 68
However, as is noted above, the Court does not appear to require
satisfaction of any confrontation interest which may be advanced by
the unavailability requirement.
The only other factor mentioned in Green which might justify re-
tention of the unavailability requirement is the notion of the prosecu-
tor's "fault.1 1612 This notion is supported by the opinion in Motes v.
United States,163 where former testimony was held inadmissible when
the witness, who had been in custody, was unavailable only because
government officers had negligently allowed him to escape. In its
analysis, the Court in Motes referred to Reynolds v. United States,"-
where former testimony was admitted when the accused procured the
159 399 U.S. at 165-66.
130 Id. at 167 n.16 (emphasis added).
161 Id.
'102 See id. at 165-67.
163 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
164198 U.S. 145 (1878).
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witness' absence, and relied upon the maxim cited in Reynolds that
"no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong."165 On
the basis of this maxim, the government was not permitted to intro-
duce the testimony of the fugitive witness in Motes. However, there
are at least two reasons why Motes is not a helpful precedent regard-
ing the unavailability requirement. First, the Motes decision can be
justified on the basis that the government failed to prove the witness
was "permanently beyond the jurisdiction of the court" at the time
the testimony was admitted, without even considering the cause of his
absence.66 Second, as the discussion above indicates, no confrontation
interest is served by an unavailability requirement. Therefore, any
notion of fault is inappropriate when compliance with the requirement
would serve no purpose.
The arguments thus far presented for constitutionally permitting ad-
mission of former testimony without showing either the unavailability
or presence of the declarant have been based upon explicit statements
that the hearsay-rule and confrontation-clause requirements are not
necessarily congruent, and upon inferences implicit in the language
and policy considerations of the Court in California v. Green. There
remains to be considered, however, the rather explicit language in
Barber v. Page which, as discussed above, seems to call for the reten-
tion of the unavailability requirement.' 67
c. Barber v. Page
The Barber decision was essentially based upon the following three
points: (1) "[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the con-
frontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given
testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant
which was subject to cross-examination bythat defendant,"'6 8 (2) "[t]he
right to confrontation is basically a trial right,"' 69 and (3) "[t]here
may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-
examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the de-
mands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be
actually unavailable," but "this is not... such a case.""-70
None of these points, however, compels the Court's apparent con-
clusion that the confrontation clause is violated by the admission of
former testimony unless the prosecution has made a good-faith effort
to obtain the declarant's presence. The Court's reference to an ex-
165 Id. at 158-59; 178 U.S. at 472.
166 178 U.S. at 474; see McCosmacK § 234 at 492-93.
167 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); see text acompanying notes 137-38 supra.
168 390 U.S. at 722.
169 Id. at 725.
170 Id. at 725-26.
"'1 Id. at 724-25. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
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ception to the confrontation requirement and its failure to mention the
hearsay exception suggest that the Court never considered the pos-
sibility that the two rules might be different. Certainly the Mattox
decision upholding the hearsay exception against constitutional at-
tack,"12 to which the Barber Court referred, was made without benefit
of the Green and Evans analysis permitting hearsay exceptions beyond
those recognized at common law.7 3 In addition, the issue of whether
the unavailability requirement is constitutionally compelled was never
directly raised in Barber; the State conceded that a showing of un-
availability was required, and therefore the only issue in dispute was
whether a sufficient showing of unavailability had been made.14 The
State never argued thai it had satisfied a standard less stringent than
that imposed by the common law. Thus, the confrontation violation
in Barber may have consisted only of the State's failure to provide the
accused with the opportunity to cross-examine the adverse witness
when the State's own ride required such an opportunity.
The Barber Court accurately stated that the right of confrontation
is basically a trial right, since confrontation secures the interests pro-
moted by opportunities for observation of the demeanor of the witness
(which can be effectively provided only at trial), as well as interests
promoted by opportunities for cross-examination (which may be pro-
vided out of the presence of the trier of fact) .y5 However, the Court's
general statement about "trial right" does not give any indication as
to what exceptions to the principle are acceptable. Furthermore, in
the case of former testimony specifically, the Green Court implied that
the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor is not constitutional-
ly relevant.1 7 6 The language in Barber compelling the retention of the
unavailability requirement must, therefore, be read in light of this
revised assessment of the necessity of an opportunity to view
demeanor as an elemet of the right to confrontation when former
testimony is being offered.
172 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
173 See text accompanying notes 124-36 supra.
174 See Brief for Respondent at 19-23, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). But
cf. California v. Green, 399 'U.S. 149, 162, 166 (1970).175 See 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); 47 TEX. L. Rsv. 331, 335 (1969). These authori-
ties also mention the practical differences between the preliminary examination
and trial as providing a reason for requiring confrontation on the latter occasion.
The "trial right" language in conjunction with the reference to the less searching
nature of preliminary hearings was seized upon by a sometime majority (but only
concurring in the final rehetring) of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in dis-
tinguishing from Barber a case involving testimony taken at a former trial. See
Whitehead v. State, 450 S.W.2d 72, 76-77, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), noted in 23
BAYLOv L. REy. 153 (1971).17 6 See 399 U.S. at 167-68; text accompanying notes 154-61 supra.
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The third point made in Barber, that there may be justification for
admitting former testimony of an unavailable witness, even though
not in the case of one who is available, 177 is of little help in determin-
ing whether the unavailability requirement is actually constitutionally
compelled. First, the Court never explained what relevant difference
exists in the two situations. It is clear from the above discussion that
the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor is not an important
difference. The only possibly significant difference between the situa-
tions inferable from Barber may lie in the fact that where the state
does not make a bona fide effort to produce the witness it may be said
to be failing to conform to its own rules. However, any distinction so
based must fail when the common-law rule is changed. Futhermore,
the two cases cited by the Court in Barber as authority for drawing
the distinction are not illuminating. In both, the determinative issue
was whether the declarant was actually unavailable; in neither case
was mention of a constitutional requirement of unavailability sup-
ported by either direct authority or policy considerations.178
In summary, the language in Barber cannot be considered as binding
in view of the facts that the issue was never squarely presented, the
only policy discussion contained therein has been made obsolete by
succeeding cases, and the Court presented no persuasive authorities
for its view. Thus, that case, when considered in conjunction with
other cases discussed, appears to present a basis for allowing admission
of former testimony without the requirement that the witness be
available.
B. Toward Constitutional Standards for Hearsay Exceptions
Although the Court in California v. Green disclaimed any desire
to set forth the general requirements of the confrontation clause, 17
Mr. Justice Harlan availed himself of the opportunity to do so in a
concurring opinion. 18  However, the elucidation proved to be only a
false start in the process-which was later completed in a concurring
opinion in Evans'8 '-of establishing an analytical framework for deter-
mining the constitutional limits of hearsay exceptions. The Green
concurring opinion resulted in a shift in the focus of the principal in-
quiry from the confrontation clause to the due process clause, a step
which permits more orderly development of hearsay law than might
otherwise be possible.
177 390 U.S. at 725-26.
178 See Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F2d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 1967); Holnan v.
Washington, 364 F2d 618, 624 (5th Cir. 1966).
179 399 U.S. at 162.1801cd. at 172-74.
281400 US. 74, 93-96 (1970).
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Mr. Justice Harlan, in his opinion in Green, viewed the confrontation
guarantee as one limited to requiring the production of a witness when
he is available to testify. 8 2 The principle was one grounded upon the
objective of fundamental fairness, as recognized by both precedent
and those hearsay-rule exceptions which permit greater flexibility for
receiving evidence when the witness is unavailable. The approach
thus proposed was seen as accommodating the state's interest in mak-
ing its case to the accused's interest in having full opportunity to make
his best defense. Even when the state satisfies the confrontation
clause by showing the witness to be unavailable, however, the ac-
cused would still be protected by due process requirements against
unreliable evidence admitted under whatever hearsay-rule exceptions
that may exist in the jurisdiction. 8"
This characterization of the confrontation right in Green was re-
jected in Dutton v. Evans,18 4 implicitly by the plurality opinion and
explicitly by Mr. Justice Harlan himself in his concurrence. 8 5  The
plurality opinion gave no consideration to the availability of the wit-
ness in upholding the Georgia co-conspirator's admission exception;
the decision seems to have been based, rather, on an inquiry into
whether the evidence thus admitted was "crucial" or "devastating."' 8"
According to the plurality, there was no suggestion of prosecutorial
misconduct or wholesale denial of cross-examination, and the hearsay
statement was deemed to have been made in circumstances which
provided "indicia of reliability" necessary to assure "'the trier of fact
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment.' ,1"'7 In terms of establishing general principles regarding the
confrontation guarantee, the opinion is much less than illuminating,
except in its adherence 1:o the view that the confrontation and hearsay
rules are not congruent.'
Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, stated his position quite
clearly:
The difficulty of this case arises from the assumption that the core purpose
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is to prevent
overly broad exceptions to the hearsay rule. I believe this assumption
to be wrong. 8 9
182 399 U.S. at 182.
183 See id. at 186 n.20, 187.
384 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
'18 Id. at 94.
186 Id, at 87; see id. at 107 (dissenting opinion); Note, Constitutional Law-The
Confrontation Test for Hearay Exceptions: An Uncertain Standard, supra note
127, at 591; 19 KYx. L. REv. 533, 538 (1971).
187 400 U.S. at 89, quoting lrom California v.. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
183Id. at 86; see id. at 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring), 104-05 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
1so Id. at 94.
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Instead, he accepted the Wigmorean view that the confrontation
clause is designed only to ensure that the proper procedure-the
opportunity for cross-examination-is followed whenever the law of
evidence then applicable requires that the testimonial statements be
given infra-judicially.190 The protection given the accused through
evidence rules barring hearsay is thus afforded not by the confron-
tation clause, but only by due process. Mr. Justice Harlan rejected
his position in Green on the ground that it would prevent reforms of
evidence law which would eliminate "the necessity for production of
declarants where production would be unduly inconvenient and of
small utility to a defendant" 91 To illustrate, although a rule requir-
ing production of the declarant would have no purpose in many situa-
tions involving the introduction into evidence of business records, the
rule formulated in the Green concurrence would preclude elimination
of the unavailability requirement for the business-records exception.1 92
The Wigmorean view would hold that the confrontation clause has
direct application in two types of cases. First, under this view the
state is compelled to permit cross-examination if the witness is pro-
duced.' 93 Thus, in Douglas v. Alabama,'" where the witness claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination but the prosecutor read aloud
his confession implicating the accused, it was held that the accused
was denied cross-examination on the confession and, thereby, his right
of confrontation. 195 Second, the confrontation clause so read means
that the state must follow its own hearsay rules. 96 For example, when
190 Id. at 94-95; 5 WiGaoRE § 1397, at 131. Wigmore lso suggests that the con-
frontation clause might have been enacted only to prevent total legislative aboli-
tion of hearsay rule. Id. at 127; see Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation,
supra note 128, at 747.
Mr. Justice Harlan recognized that his approach is not necessarily consistent
with the Court's prior pronouncements, but he saw it as a way of rationalizing
the results in the earlier cases. 400 U.S. at 97.
191 400 U.S. at 95-96 (Harland J., concurring). The opinion goes on to suggest
that production of the declarant can properly be dispensed with under any reas-
onable [as an evidentiary matter?] hearsay exception: "If the hearsay exception
involved in a given case is such as to commend itself to reasonable men, produc-
tion of the declarant is likely to be difficult, unavailing, or pointless." Id. at 96.
In the unusual situation where production of the witness would nevertheless be
advantageous, the accused may use his right of compulsory process. Id.
192 Compare McCoaancx §§ 283-88 (common-law business records exception)
wuith FED. R. E-m. 803(6)-(7) and Um-roim Busmxss REcoRns As Ev sacE AcT.
193 See 5 WIGMOIOR § 1397, at 131; Note, The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Ex-
ceptions: An Uncertain Standard, supra note 127, at 593-94.
194 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
195 Id. at 419.
96Id. at 422.
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the applicable rules require as a prerequisite to the admission of
former testimony the opportunity to cross-examine on the same
issues"' or unavailability of the witness,"" the state must comply if it
is not to be held in violation of the confrontation right 99 Other than
in these two situations--specifically, when considering the constitu-
tional acceptability of a hearsay rule or exception generally-the
standard is provided by due process. °0
Unquestionably, due :process notions are imprecise and subject to
change, but the policies 'behind the confrontation guarantee have been
explored so little as to make standards virtually non-existent.201 Given
the universal rejection of a literal reading of the guarantee, and the
minute historical and judicial gloss that has been given to the pro-
vision, the confrontation.-clause questions have come down to a search
for requirements to assu:e fairness in the government's prosecution of
10 7 See PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 19, § 582 (Purdon 1964).
108 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968).
199 See 5 Wxaaoa § 1397, at 131.200 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). This
residual application of due process standards was apparently overlooked in Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), when the Court said:
[T]he question cannot be made to depend upon the rules of criminal evi-
dence prevailing in the courts of the State in which the crime was com-
mitted. It must be determined with reference to the rights of the accused
as secured by the Constitution of the United States.... We are un-
willing to hold it to be consistent with the constitutional requirement that
an accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him .... [to
permit introduction of former testimony of a witness unavailable because
of prosecutorial negligence] .... Id. at 474.
See also Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954):
While the Sixth Amendment does not prevent creation of new exceptions
to the hearsay rule based upon real necessity and adequate guarantees
of trustworthiness, it doea embody those requirements as essential to all
exceptions to the rule, present or future. To hold otherwise would be to
hold that Congress could abolish the right of confrontation by making
unlimited exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Mr. Justice Harlan reached the same conclusion in his opinion in Green. 399
U.S. at 179; see Seidelson, Hecrsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 Gao.
WASH. L. REV. 76, 85-88 (1971).
One practical advantage of this due process analysis is that it can relieve the
Court of much of the burden of reviewing specific evidentiary rulings which would
be assumed if the confrontation clause were used to incorporate the hearsay
rule. See Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1438
(1966); 19 KAKs. L. Rv. 533, 534-35 (1971). Under this analysis the repetitive
confrontation cases can be htndled fairly easily by the lower courts; only due
process questions involving entire exceptions need come before the Court.201 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Note,
Constitutional Law-The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncer-
tain Standard, supra note 127, at 594-95. See generally, The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 Hrtv. L. REv. 1, 111 & n.14 (1970).
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an accused.2 0 2 Therefore, arguments regarding the admissibility of
particular hearsay exceptions are better addressed to the issue of
whether they preserve fundamental fairness "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty. '20 3  Under such an analysis the confrontation
clause would retain its viability in cases where the state denies cross-
examination of an available witness or fails to comply with its own
rules, yet it would not petrify the hearsay rules. As a consequence,
the fairness inquiry is made directly rather than obliquely.204
C. Due Process: An Analytical Framework
1. Evidentiary Trustworthiness
The due process standard which Mr. Justice Harlan would have
applied when judging the admissibility of hearsay evidence is not
entirely clear from his opinions in Green and Evans. However, it
appears that his view would require no more than the trustworthiness
and necessity which justify admission of hearsay testimony under the
traditional exceptions. For example, in Evans he tested the proffered
hearsay by whether it had "some likelihood of trustworthiness" and
whether "unless the out-of-court declaration can be proved by hearsay
evidence, the facts it reveals are likely to remain hidden from the
jury ... .,,1205 The only additional consideration mentioned is that the
necessity for the evidence should be weighed "against the danger that
a jury will give it undue credit." '2 ° Mr. Justice Harlan's due process
inquiry in Green made the evidentiary test even more critical. The
preliminary hearing testimony in that case was not "obtained under
circumstances .. . so unreliable that its admission requires reversal
as a matter of due process ... ,"20" Apparently, in order for the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence fo be held unconstitutional, it would have to
be "on evidence so unreliable and untrustworthy that it may be said
the accused had been tried by a kangaroo court," or "so infected...
202 This is reflected in the criteria applied in both Green and Evans. The Green
test of whether the presentation of the evidence "will still afford the trier of fact
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement," 399 U.S. at
161, is essentially an inquiry into the fairness of the procedure followed. Similar
considerations are behind the Evans inquiries into whether the evidence was"crucial" or "devastating," 400 U.S. at 87, and into the "indicia of reliability" of
the evidence. Id. at 89.203 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).204 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Sur-
vey and Criticism, 66 YAL L.J. 319, 338 (1957).
205 400 U.S. at 99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 Id.
207 399 U.S. at 189.
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as to give rise to an irreparable likelihood of [error] .... ,,208
This notion that due process requires only evidentiary reasonable-
ness,20 when taken in connection with the interpretation that the con-
frontation clause requires only cross-examination of in-court witnesses
and compliance with the applicable hearsay rules,210 lends support to
Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion that the constitutional protection for
criminal defendants against hearsay evidence is very close to nuga-
tory.211 However, it is his acceptance of Mr. Justice Harlan's stand-
ard which deprives the due process provision of value in these cases
and makes the Green and Evans decisions appear less solicitous of
defendants' rights than they have the potential to be. Realization of
that potential requires weighing the, interests discussed in the next
section.
2. An Interest Analysis
In a criminal trial, due process requires those procedures which are
essential to ensure "the reliability of the truth-determining process2 1 22
and "respect for the dignity of the individual. ' 21 3 The evidentiary rules
of admissibility are generally directed primarily toward ensuring the
reliability of the process, although they may on occasion be utilized to
protect an individual's dignity.214 In the particular case of the hearsay
exceptions, individual dignity is seldom an issue, since admission of
evidence does not by itself involve the dignitary injuries of privacy
intrusion, harassment, or brutality by overweening officials.21 5
2o8 Id. at 186 n0, citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (19i5); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
20o See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 110 n!1 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).210 See text accompanying notes 189-200 supra.
211 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 110 & n.11 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see Seidelson, supra note 200, at 85. 'The issue is further confused by a footnote
from which it may be inferred Mr. Justice Harlan believes the same constitu-
tional standard of admissibility applies to both civil and criminal actions. 400
U.S. at 97 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 110 n.l (Viarshall, J., dissenting).
212 Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALn. L. REv. 215
219 (1981). See generally Kadish, supra note 204, at 346-47; Ratner, The Fune-
tions of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1065-66 (1968).
213 The concern here is with avoiding governmental over-reaching regardless
of its effect on evidentiary trustvorthiness. See generally Kadish, supra, note 204,
at 347; Ratner, supra note 212, at 1068. The Supreme Court has essentially
adopted this distinction in deciding whether to give retroactive effect to new
constitutional standards of criminal procedure. See Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646, 653-55 & n.7 (1971) (plurality opinion).
214 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655-657 (1961).
215 See generally Knowlton, The Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio and Due Process
of Law, 49 Iowa L. Rsv. 14, 17-18 (1963); Ratner, supra note 212, at 1068.
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A major factor in' the, reliability of the truth-determining process
is that to which Mr. Justice Harlan gave most of his attention, eviden-
tiary trustworthiness. The state and the accused each have an
interest in making certain that the outcome of trial is based upon trust-
worthy evidence so that only "deserving" deprivations of life, liberty,
or property will be effected.21 However, the reliability of the system
does not and7 as a practical matter, could not depend upon absolute
evidentiary tiustworthiness. The problem is thus to identify- the
competing interests -which determine the margin of error tolerable
in our jurisprudential system. 17  One such interest is that of the
public in avoiding the maintenance of a truth-determination process
which is excessively ineffecient or expensive.21S  Specifically, due
process does not require procedures whose benefits, in terms of
protecting the reliability of the.process or the dignity of the individual,
are outweighted by their costs in time or money to the public as prose-
cutor and truth-determiner. Against the practical "ills of too much
procedure," however, must be weighed the accused's interest in hav-
ing the fullest practicable opportunity to present his best defense.219
Satisfaction of this interest requires opportunities for the defendant
both to discredit the prosecutor's evidence 220 (which clearly reflects
upon the trustworthiness of that evidence) and to develop favorable
testimony (which ensures completeness, rather than just accuracy).
The reliability of an adversary system of criminal justice depends
upon implementation of this dual interest of the accused.
In weighing these three interest factors in connection with a hearsay
declaration, first consideration should be given to evidentiary trust-
worthiness, since the circumstances in which the statement was made
may alone ensure that the possible error would not be intolerable.
231 See Newman, supra note 212, at 228; cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
186 n.20, 189 (Harlan, J., concurring).
217 See Kadish, supra note 204, at 348-49; Newman, supra note 212, at 228.218 See Newman, supra note 212, at 227-29.
219 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 187 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring, see
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1987) (compulsory process to secure
witnesses); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707,
712 n.8 (1967) (dictum) (discovery of accused's statements). That this interest
must be weighed against other interests, evidentiary trustworthiness for example,
is apparent from the cases dealing with the claimed right of the accused to com-
pel discovery of evidence in the hands of the prosecution. See Cicenia v. Lagay,
357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1952); cf. Ap-
plication of Tune, 230 F.2d 883, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1956); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,
209-25, 98 A.2d 881, 884-93 (1953), adhered to, 17 N.J. 100, 108-09, 110 A.2d 99,
103-104 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955). But see State v. Tune, supra at
227-33, 98 A.2d at 894-97 (dissenting opinion).220 See Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 422-23 (1953).
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The norm for tolerable error should be that possible when evidence
is given in court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination, so that
the trier may observe the witness' demeanor.22' Therefore, hearsay
which is highly trustworthy and the equivalent of infra-judicial testi-
mony, such as would be the case with some business records, should
be admissible without: consideration of either the cost to the state of
examining the declarant in court or the effect on the accused's op-
portunity to present his best defense.2 2 To the extent that the evi-
dence is less trustworthy, further consideration must be given to
comparison of the extent to which the opportunity to present a full
defense is impaired by the hearsay and the costs to the public of
requiring in-court tesijmony.
3. Due Process and the Unavailability Requirement
When this due process analysis is applied to abandonment of the
former-testimony unavailability requirement, it is seen that (1) the
evidence would still essentially meet the reliability norms which are
in the interest of both the state and the accused. (2) However, the
burden of providing available witnesses under the present require-
ment presumably has minimal effect upon the state's interest in effi-
cient and inexpensive procedures. (3) Nevertheless, the infringement
upon the accused's interest in presenting his best defense, which would
result from abandoning the requirement, is also likely to be only
minimal. Within the "motive and interest" standard whereby testi-
monial reliability is normally judged, only the demeanor afforded by
confrontation is lacking when former testimony is offered. Since cross-
examination is a far more important condition and is satisfied when
such testimony is offered, the opportunity for the trier of fact to
evaluate the truth of former testimony closely approaches the pre-
scribed norm. This opportunity given the declarant to explain contra-
dictions or clarify ambiguities in his statement contributes to the relia-
bility of both at-trial statements and former testimony; under the
other hearsay exceptions, such explanations are possible, if at all, only
sometime after making the statement. A final factor enhancing the
reliability of former testimony may be its closer proximity in time to
the observations recounted. However, against these positive trust-
worthiness aspects must be weighed the fact that in certain circum-
stances, such as in the case of testimony taken from a preliminary
hearing, the incentives to develop the testimony fully may be less than
in the case involving former testimony given at a trial. Thus, it might
be proper to reach differing conclusions on the constitutionality of
22 1 See FED. R. Evi., Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem 95; The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 109 n.6 (1970).
22 2 Cf. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) & Advisory Committee's Note, at 108, 112-15.
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removing the unavailability requirement depending on, for example,
the tribunal or legal issues. 223
Regarding the state's interest raised in the second point above,
for purposes of argument it seems reasonable to assume that obtaining
the presence of the declarant who is amenable to process or otherwise
available has not required excessive effort or expenditure and that
there is, therefore, little justification for abandoning the unavailability
requirement. To the extent, of course, that this assumption is untrue,
there is a better argument for abrogating the requirement.
Turning to the third point, however, by hypothesis stated earlier,
infra-judicial testimony would be only marginally more trustworthy
than the prior testimony. Therefore, it may be argued that the injury
to the accused's interest in having the fullest opportunity to present
his best defense is also only minimal. In weighing this deprivation
against the injury to the suggested state interest, it may be helpful to
consider that in modern practice there is no "best evidence rule" aside
from that applied when the contents of a document are in issue.224
Taking as an example a situation which may arise, former testimony
may generally be proved by oral testimony even if a certified tran-
script of the prior declaration is available.225 To the extent that the
oral testimony is less trustworthy than the transcript, the accused is
deprived of his best defense, yet no due process argument has been
sustained against the procedure. A second factor to consider in this
connection is that the accused has a right to compulsory process. 22
Thus, admission of the former testimony of the available declarant does
not work a deprivation of the opportunity to present his case. If the
accused believes that the infra-judicial examination of the declarant
would be valuable in that it might increase the reliability of the
process, he is free to call the declarant. This argument may, however,
neglect two important factual considerations. First, as is discussed
above, there is a question whether the opportunity to make a case by
direct examination of an unsympathetic -witness is as good as develop-
ing the same case by the same witness on cross-examination. 227 Even
if the accused is not limited in his direct examination by the rules
against leading questions and impeachment of one's own witness, the
tactical situation does not favor the direct examiner's attacking what
223 See Whitehead v. State, 450 S.W.2d 72, 76-77, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
224 See McCoRMic §§ 195-96.
225 See, e.g., State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 165-66, 177 P.2d 689, 701 (1947);
Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 700, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Graham, Californ's
"Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codifi-
cation Fiasco, 4 LovoLA U. (LA.) L. RPv. 279, 297 (1971).
226 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); see Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
227 See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
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the jury perceives as his witness. 228  The second difficulty with saying
that compulsory process keeps the accused from being deprived of the
opportunity to make his best defense is that there may be substantial
expense or inconvenience in utilizing compulsory process. Particu-
larly in the case of the indigent defendant, there may be some depriva-
tion of the best defense if the prosecution does not pay for the pro-
duction of such witnesse. 2 29
As an original proposi.tion, there appears to be a very strong argu-
ment that admission of former testimony of an available declarant
does not violate due process. The margin of error possible when the
original evidence is relatively trustworthy-because of its submission
to cross-examination and the opportunity available to the accused to
bring out favorable evidence at both the prior and present hearings230
-- does not seem to be intolerable in a free society. It is true that
in Berger v. CaiiforniO22 ' the Supreme Court indicated that when the
prosecutorial authorities had not made a good-faith effort to secure the
22. But see FED. R. Evm. 836, which permits the adverse party to examine the
declarant of a hearsay staterment as if under cross-examination. The problem is,
of course, whether the jury will perceive the examination in that fashion. Cf.
Seidelson, supra note 200, at 94.229 See Note, The Indigenes Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investi-
gational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CoRxN. L. Ruv. 632, 641-42 (1970);
cf. Goldstein, The State and t;he Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Pro-
cedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 182-83 (1960); 32 Mo. L. Ruv. 543, 545 (1967).
230 A further factor affecting the opportunity for a full defense is the admissi-
bility of impeaching evidence. In Mattox v. United States, over a strong dissent,
see 156 U.S. at 251-61 (Shias, Gray & White, J.J., 'dissenting), the Court held
that inconsistent statements made subsequent to the prior hearing were inadmis-
sible to impeach the former testimony of a deceased witness because the founda-
tion questions could not be asked of the witness and because the temptation to
fabricate testimony would be almost irresistible if the rule were otherwise. 156
U.S. at 249-50; cf. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(2-1 decision) (signed statement recanting former testimony excluded because
insufficiently authenticated). The Mattox holding was distinguished in Carver
v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897), involving a dying declaration impeached by
subsequent evidence, on the ground that the declarant in Mattox had been pre-
viously cross-examined. Id. at 697-98; see Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examina-
tion, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 Gun. LJ. 939, 952 (1968). However,
the better view would seem to be that in any case in which cross-examination
is denied, the accused should be permitted to present impeaching evidence as if
the witness were present. See Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation, supra
note 128, at 757-58. Fun. R. MvM. 806 permits the credibility of a hearsay de-
clarant to be attacked (and supported) by any evidence admissible if he had
testified. In such impeachment there is no requirement that the declarant be
afforded an opportunity to deny or explain inconsistent statements or conduct. Id.
This foundation requirement is relaxed regardless of whether the inconsistency
was prior or subsequent to the hearsay statement. See id., Advisory Committee's
Note, at 132-33.
231393 U.S. 314 (1969) (per curiam).
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declarant's presence, the accused's "inability to cross-examine [the
declarant] at the trial may have had a significant effect on 'the in-
tegrity of the fact-finding process.' ',232 This language might be read
to mean that admission of former testimony in such a case violates
due process. Nevertheless, such a conclusion need not be reached if
consideration is given to the setting in which Berger was decided.
The precise question in the case was whether the confrontation-right
holding of Barber v. Page2 33 should be given retroactive effect. Under
current standards one of the principal considerations in deciding that
issue is whether the newly announced constitutional doctrine is re-
lated to "the very integrity of the fact-finding process."2 The Berger
Court properly found that denial of the confrontation right guaranteed
in Barber did raise serious questions about the accuracy of guilty
verdicts2 35 in pre-Barber trials, since the defendant's inability to cross-
examine had an effect on whether the fact-finder had an adequate op.
portunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.2 36 However, since the
question in Berger was retroactivity and not due process, if Barber
is read as requiring only that the state conform to its own hearsay
rules,23 7 the reference in Berger to "the integrity of the fact-finding
process" will be irrelevant when the applicable rule permits admission
of former testimony by an available declarant. In other words, a
distinction should be drawn between the effect on the criminal process
when applying new constitutional doctrine retroactively, on the one
hand, and the effect when testing a procedure against due process as
an original question, on the other.
V. CONSTrrU NAL ASPECTS oF OTHER FonER-TEsTmioNY SrruATiois
The Advisory Committee noted three situations involving former
testimony, in addition to the issue concerning the availability of the
declarant, which raise confrontation questions: (1) Testimony offered
against its former proponent, (2) testimony given in another proceed-
232 Id. at 315, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
233 390 U.S. 719 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 137-38, 168-78 supra.
234 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965); see, e.g., Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646, 652 n.5, 653-55 (1971); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-99
(1967). See generally Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, The Supreme Court-1964 Term, 79 HEav. L.
REV. 56 (1965).
235 "Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an
aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function
and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past
trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect" Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
236 See 393 U.S. at 315.
237 See text accompanying notes 168-78 supra.
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ing, and (3) testimony given when only a person similarly situated,
and not the accused, was a party.2 38 In none of the three situations
was any special limitation placed on the use of former testimony in
criminal trials, 239 since the drafters would appear to have assumed
that if a dying declaration untested by cross-examination is constitu-
tionally admissible, former testimony tested by the examination of
even a person only similarly situated, the most extreme of the above
three situations, should not "offend against confrontation." 240
The premise on whic.h the Advisory Committee relied is, however,
open to question. While recent Supreme Court decisions have in dicta
referred to the admissf.bility of dying declarations,20' the exception
has never been upheld against specific constitutional challenge.242
Thus, no precedent stands in the way of its reconsideration in light
of the due process analysis formulated above. In fact7 a strong case
can be made that the exception would be unable to withstand such
analysis. First, the trustworthiness of a statement made in belief of
impending death is highly suspect. Such evidence is not, of course,
amenable to the in-court reliability factors of oath, demeanor, or
cross-examination. Neither do the circumstances of its making pro-
vide a circumstantial guarantee of reliability. The declarant's sin-
cerity might well respond to the situation with veracity-although
this is increasingly questionable in the modern religious climate-
but the effect of his condition in extremis on his perception and
memory should make the court highly dubious as to the trustworthi-
ness of the evidence.24 1 Furthermore, this exception may involve
neither a likelihood that faulty statements will be corrected when
made' 44 nor an opportunity to challenge the evidence by some means
238 See FE. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 127-28.
289 See Fm. R. Evm. 804(b) (1).
240 Fm. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), Advisory Committee's Note, at 128; see Falknor,
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 659-
60 (1963).241 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
407 (1965).
2.12 See Seidelson, supra note 200, at 89-90. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892), is the case usually cited for the proposition that the sixth amendment
is not a bar to admissibility. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). Mattrx presented no confrontation issue, how-
ever, as it involved a declaration offered on behalf of the accused, not against
him. See 146 U.S. at 151. "[D]ictum [has begotten] dictum, and, through a
process of accretion, there is recognition and reaffirmation of a 'holding' never
reached in a case which neither involved nor considered the sixth amendment."
Seidelson supra note 200, at 39-90.
243 See Note, Dying Declarations, 46 IowA L. Rav. 375-76 (1961).
244 See, e.g., Houston Oxygem Co., Inc. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 6-7, 161 S.W.2d 474,
477 (1942) (statement of present sense impression); 5 WiGmo § 1522 (regular
entries).
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other than cross-examination of the actual declarant.245  The second
factor indicating constitutional vulnerability of the dying declaration
exception, and one which must be weighed against the lack of re-
liability, is the state's need for relevant evidence. Since by definition
the declarant is unavailable, there is no other way for the court to
obtain the declarant's testimony. A third interest of concern is that of
the accused in having a full opportunity to present his best defense.
In the case of a dying declaration the accused has no opportunity at
all to cross-examine the declarant, although there may be some op-
portunity to attack the statements collaterally by cross-examining" the
-witness regarding the circumstances in which the statements were
given- 246 Nevertheless, such collateral cross-examination can neither
provide an effective check on the declarant's preception, memory, or
sincerity, nor bring out evidence favorable to the defendant. Given
the questionable trustworthiness of a dying declaration, therefore, it
appears that the accused could make a strong argument that admission
of a dying declaration violates his right to due process. In conse-
quence, any resolution of the former-testimony issues under consider-
ation cannot be analogized to or premised upon the admissibility of
dying declarations, but instead requires separate analysis.
Turning to the first of the three situations considered by the Ad-
visory Committee, in due process terms the offering of testimony
against its former proponent should cause little difficulty. There may
be a slight reduction of evidentiary trustworthiness because of the
previously discussed inhibitions in attacking one's own witness, but
otherwise, in terms of the effects on the accused's interest in a full
defense and the state's interest in efficient criminal process, former
testimony offered against its proponent does not differ from other
former testimony situations previously discussed.
Likewise, when former testimony from another proceeding is offered,
the application of the "similar motive and interest" criteria in the
particular case might somewhat reduce the satisfaction of the trust-
worthiness and full-defense interests. So long as the "motive and
interest" requirement is applied within proper limits, however, there
should be no fundamental unfairness to the accused.
When former testimony is offered against an accused who was not
a party to the former proceeding, a due process problem might exist.247
It is true that examination conducted by another person with the same
24  See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 113 n22 (1970).
246 Cf. id. at 113-14 & n.22.
247 Cf. Falknor, supra note 240, at 656-60; Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examina-
tion, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, supra note 230, at 948; Note, Preserving
the Right to Confrontation, supra note 128, at 759-60.
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motive and interest to develop the testimony should ensure that it is
not so untrustworthy that its admission would be fundamentally un-
fair. Furthermore, the state interest is similar to that which existed
in other former testimony cases as previously discussed. Nevertheless,
a difficulty may be perceived when considering the accused's oppor-
tunity to present his best defense. When compared to his opportunity
in other former testimony situations, he is substantially prejudiced-
he has no opportunity at any time to test the declarant's preception,
memory, or sincerity, or to elicit favorable testimony. However, when
compared to the dying declaration situation, as was done by the Ad-
visory Committee in reaching its conclusion, there is no substantial
difference in the accused's opportunity to make his defense. If dying
declarations satisfy due process, then so should former testimony in
this situation. However, even if dying declarations are constitutionally
inadmissible, as would seem likely in view of analysis developed above,
it may be argued that this type of former testimony is distinguishable
because of trustworthiess substantially greater than that of dying
declarations, and that it should therefore be admissible. An exception
to this conclusion should probably be applied when the declarant is
available to testify. In that exceptional case recognition should be
given to the accused's greater interest in production of a witness he
has never had an opportunity to examine.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is perhaps understandable, given the infrequent appearance of the
issues at the Supreme Court level, that the Court's recent pronounce-
ments on the constitutional standards for confrontation cases have
evidenced no clearly discernable approach. This ambiguity is espe-
cially unfortunate in its effect on the former-testimony provision of
the proposed Federal Rules, for the drafters may well have been
thereby inhibited from removing one of the least justifiable evidentiary
restrictions, that requi-ing the declarant to be unavailable. The
Federal Rules' treatment of the criteria ensuring reliability and of
testimony offered against its former proponent, while perhaps not the
most radical reforms possible, constitute at least substantial moderni-
zations of the former-testimony exception. To retain the unavailability
requirement in this context, however, is to perpetuate an anachronism
-and unnecessarily, in view of the argument which can be made that
it is not constitutionally compelled. Therefore, removal of the re-
quirement should be a high priority change in the final Rules.
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